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III.

JURISDICTION

This appeal is taken from a Utah Court of Appeals decision dated November 13,
2009. The Utah Supreme Court granted Appellant's Petition for Certiorari on February
18,2010.
IV, STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S) & STANDARD(S) OF REVIEW
The issue before the Court is as follows:
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Trial Court decision that
the November 9, 2006, sheriffs sale involving Appellee's real property should be set
aside, even though Appellee failed to follow the redemption rules and let the
redemption period expire.
A.
1.

DETERMINITIVE LAW

Rule 69C. Redemption of real property after sale.
(a) Right of redemption. Real property may be redeemed unless the estate is less than a
leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which case the sale is absolute.
(b) Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be redeemed by the
defendant or by a creditor having a lien on the property junior to that on which the
property was sold or by their successors in interest. If the defendant redeems, the effect of
the sale is terminated and the defendant is restored to the defendant's estate. If the
property is redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may
redeem.
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount required to the
purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser:
(c)(1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the redemptioner claims the
right to redeem;
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish the claim; and
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien.
(d) Time for redemption. The property may be redeemed within 180 days after the sale.

2.

Huston vs. Lewis. 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991).
It is well established that the right of redemption is a substantive right to be exercised in

strict accord with statutory terms. Not only is the right of redemption substantive, but also we
have stated that the procedures for redemption often confer substantive rights.
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Generally,

therefore, when the procedure at issue affects the substantive rights of the parties, the procedure
should be followed strictly in order to not interfere with those rights.
3.

Mollerup v. Storage Systems International 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court, sitting in equity, may in

appropriate instances extend the period. This Court has recognized that equitable
principle by setting aside a sale after the time for redemption had expired, when
the sale was attended by such substantial irregularities as must have prevented a
sale at a fair sum, resulting in a gross sacrifice of the judgment creditor's property.
4.

Young v. Schroeden 37 P 252 (Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah

1894).
This Court set forth a two-part test for setting aside a sheriff sale after the
redemption period had lapsed. The Court held that sales can be set aside if there is
a gross inadequacy of price, coupled with the irregularities attending the sale,
unless the complaining party is stopped by his own laches.
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue before this Court, whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
although Appellee failed to follow the redemption rules and let the redemption period expire, the
November 9, 2006 Sheriffs sale should be said aside, is a question of law." Trujillo v. Jenkins,
840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992).
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings & Disposition in Court Below.
This case arises out of a judgment entered on behalf of Appellants and against
Appellee. Appellants attempted to collect on a judgment owed by Appellee to Appellants
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by executing on property owned by Appellee at a sheriffs sale. On September 12, 2006,
the Sheriff issued a certificate of sale for Appellee's property after posting written notice
of time, date, and place of sale. Notice of the sale was also published in the Sanpete
County Messenger.
The Sheriffs sale was held on November 9, 2006, at the Sanpete County
Courthouse. Appellant Justin C. Bond purchased the property at the Sheriffs sale.
Appellee failed to tender the redemption amount prior to May 9, 2007, (180 days after the
Sheriffs sale). After the redemption period ended, Sheriff Kevin G. Holman issued a
Sheriffs deed to Appellant.
On June 26, 2007, Appellee filed an action in the Sixth District Court seeking to
set aside the Sheriffs sale. An evidentiary hearing was held on June 23, 2008.
Subsequently, the Trial Court issued a memorandum decision and a final order which set
aside the November 9, 2006, Sheriffs sale. Appellant appealed the Trial Court's
decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. On November 13, 2009, the Utah Court of
Appeals issued an opinion affirming the ruling of the Trial Court.
VI.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

DORIUS BOND REYES & LINARES (The Firm) began representing Appellee as
personal representative of the Estate of Molly Pyper in the summer of 2002, until the Court
signed an order of withdrawal in April 2004. (R. 450 page 180)

2.

The Firm represented Appellee in a probate action. Appellee was appointed the personal
representative. (R. 450 page 1181)
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The Firm also represented Appellee in an eviction action against Appellee's sister Debra
Lambson, who was living in a home owned by the Estate of Molly Pyper. (R. 450 page 181182)
During the Firm's representation of Appellee, there was a substantial accrual of attorney
fees. In addition, there were substantial costs regarding the probate action, such as notice to
creditors, title reports, etc. The Firm paid for these expenses. (R. 450 page 195)
Appellee made several small payments but repeatedly ignored the billing statements. The
Firm withdrew in April 2004.
Appellant filed a Notice of Lien against the property. The Lien was recorded with the
County Recorder on July 21, 2004. A copy was sent to Appellee. (R. 450 page 197)
A Notice of Lien was also filed with the Sixth District Court on July 21, 2004. A copy
was sent to Appellee. (R. 450 page 197)
On December 10, 2004, the Firm filed an action with the Sixth District Court to collect
the outstanding Attorney Fees. The Firm obtained a judgment in the sum of $10,577.23. Prior
to and after obtaining the Judgment, Appellee filed several Chapter 13 bankruptcies. The
bankruptcies filed by Appellee were dismissed. R. (R. 168)
The attorneys' fees owed to the firm survived the bankruptcy proceedings filed by
Appellee, and the firm moved forward with attempts to collect the debt. (R. 168)
Pyper did not contact the firm to make payments, discuss the debt, or negotiate a
settlement. (R. 168)
A writ of execution was issued, and Appellee was served personally on September 22,
2006. (R. 450p 198)
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12.

The Sanpete County Sheriff recorded a Notice of Levy on September 21, 2006, and
recorded a Certificate of Summary Judgment with the Sanpete County Recorder. (R. 168)

13.

On September 21, 2006, the Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale after posting written
notice of time, date and place of sale and posting said notice twenty-one (21) days on the
property and at the place of sale, Sanpete Courthouse and three (3) places in the precinct where
the property is located. Notice of Sale was advertised in the Sanpete Messenger for three (3)
issues, once a week in successive weeks prior to the sale. The Sheriff scheduled a sale of the
property on November 9, 2006. (R. 168)

14.

The Sheriffs sale was held on November 9, 2006, at the Sanpete County Courthouse. (R.
450p198)

15.

Justin C. Bond was the only bidder present at the sale. Justin C. Bond of the firm
purchased the property at said sale. (R. 450 p 198)

16.

After the redemption period of 180 days, Sheriff Kevin G. Holman issued a Sheriffs
Deed to Justin C. Bond. (R. 450 p 202)

17.

Prior to the redemption period expiring, Dale Dorius spoke personally with Appellee. (R.
450p212)

18.

Appellee offered $8,500.00 payable at a future date to pay off the attorney fee debt. (R.
450p212)

19.

Appellee did not have the funds available to pay off any judgment amount. Appellee
merely requested the firm remove the lien so that Appellee could obtain a loan against the
property. (R. 450 p 212)

20.

At no time did Appellee tender money with the Court as required by law. At no time did
Appellee deliver certified funds to the Firm. (R. 406)
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21.

Prior to the elapse of the redemption period, Appellee did nothing other than make an
unacceptable offer and did not have the funds to pay that offer. (R. 450 p 212)

22.

The Firm followed all rules, statutes, notice requirements, service requirements, time
frames, and paid for all costs associated therewith. (R. 168)

23.

During the evidentiary hearing in the Trial Court, Appellee and Appellant stipulated that
all rules were followed regarding the sale of the property and that nothing was irregular about
the Sheriff sale itself.
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Trial Court's decision that the November 9,

2006 Sheriffs sale should be set aside even though Appellee failed to follow the redemption
rules and let the redemption period expire.
VIII. ARGUMENT
I.

The Utah Court of Appeals Misapplied Young v. Schroeder and Pender v.
Dowse and Failed to Follow Other Relevant Case Law.

In the above action, a Sheriff sale was held on November 9, 2006, the Sheriff issued
proper notice regarding the time, place, and date of the sale. Pyper received notice of the
Sheriffs sale. Justin C. Bond was the only person to attend the sale and purchased the estate
property for $329.50. Appellee failed to tender the required redemption funds, and the 180-day
redemption period lapsed. After the redemption period lapsed the Sanpete County Sheriff issued
a sheriffs deed to Bond and Dorius. Pyper filed an action in the Sixth District Court to have the
Sheriffs sale set aside.
At an evidentiary hearing held on June 23, 2008, the Trial Court set aside the Sheriffs
sale. The trial court ruled that the inadequacy of price between the value of the property and the
purchase price paid at the sale "shock[ed] the conscience of an impartial mind." The Trial Court
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further found that Bond and Dorius' actions amounted to at least "slight circumstances of
unfairness" to Pyper. The Trial Court concluded that the gross inadequacy of price, together
with Bond and Dorius' unfair actions, gave the Trial Court the equitable power to set aside the
sheriff sale despite the expiration of the redemption period.
Appellant filed an appeal of the Trial Court's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. The
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's decision. The Utah Court of Appeals reasoned
that the gross inadequacy of price, coupled with Bond and Dorius' slight circumstances of
unfairness justified the Trial Court's decision to set aside the Sheriff sale. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that Bond and Dorius' failure to return Pyper's phone calls amounted to slight
circumstances of unfairness to Pyper and justified the Trial Court's decision.
The Utah Court of Appeals based their argument on Young v. Schroeder, 1 P. 252 (Utah
1894), and Pender v. Dowse. 265 P.2d 644 (Utah 1954). The Utah Court of Appeals held "[w]e
conclude that the district court's ruling here comports with the principles applied in both Young
and Pender. (Pyper vs. Bond, 2009 Ut App 331, paragraph 16) However, the Utah Court of
Appeals misapplied the principles in both Young and Pender.
In Young, a suit was initiated after expiration of the redemption period. This Court set
aside the sale on the grounds that there was a gross sacrifice of the debtor's property and the
sales were attended by many and serious irregularities, for which the parties claiming under the
sales themselves were directly responsible. Young at 256.
This Court in Young also relied on the following facts: the purchasers directed the land to
be sold in parcels in a manner that prevented the land from being sold at a fair price, and the
purchasers assured the debtor that they would not insist on the statutory period for redemption.
Young at 256, Huston v. Lewis. 818 p.2d 531, 535.
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In Young, the purchaser made affirmative actions regarding the sale itself and made
specific representations toward the debtor. The purchaser directed how the sale was to take
place. This influenced the sale itself and prevented the land from being sold at a fair price. The
purchaser in Young also made specific representations to the debtor that the statutory period of
redemption would not be insisted upon. These affirmative actions and representations were
directly aimed at impeding redemption. In other words, the purchaser in Young actively took
part in the sheriff sale itself by directing how the parcels were to be sold. This active
participation gave the purchaser an advantage and frustrated the sale itself. The purchaser, in
Young also made representations in an effort to mislead the debtor.
The actions by the purchasers in Young were far more unfair and serious than the alleged
slight circumstances of unfairness relied on by the Utah Court of Appeals in the present action.
In the present action, neither Bond nor Dorius made any affirmative actions regarding the sale of
the property, nor did they influence the sale in any way. Furthermore, neither Bond nor Dorius
made any specific representations to Pyper about the redemption period.
Pyper contacted both Bond and Dorius. Pyper offered $8,500 and stated he needed the
lien removed so that he could obtain a loan against the property.

Bond and Dorius were

unwilling to remove the lien and Dorius told this to Pyper. Thereafter, the redemption period
expired. In essence, Pyper made an offer to resolve the debt which was refused by Bond and
Dorius. R. 450 p. 212. Also see Memorandum Decision (Including Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law), Judge David L. Mower paragraph 25, attached hereto.
Furthermore, at the evidentiary hearing, Pyper admitted he did not have the funds
necessary to pay off the judgment and he needed the lien removed to obtain a loan from his
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sister. R 450 pg. 122. Attached hereto. It is clear Pyper was trying to get Bond and Dorius to
remove the lien so he could obtain financing. Bond and Dorius were unwilling to agree to this.
The Utah Court of Appeals made two conclusions about Young, which they then applied
to the present action. The first is that a gross inadequacy of price coupled with any
circumstances of unfairness by the purchaser toward the debtor, however slight, justify setting
aside a sheriff sale. Pyper vs. Bond at paragraph 16. The second is that even a lack of
affirmative actions on the part of the purchaser can constitute slight circumstances of unfairness.
Pyper vs. Bond at paragraph 18. The principles in Young do not stand for either of these
conclusions.
Again, in Young, the purchaser directly influenced the sale itself which put the debtor at
a disadvantage. Also in Young, the purchaser made a specific representation to the debtor that
the statutory period would not be relied on. It is clear why this Court set the sale aside in Young
The purchaser in Young was clearly influencing the sale itself and misleading the debtor so that
the redemption period would expire. However, in the present action neither Bond nor Dorius
had anything to do with the Sheriff sale itself. Further, neither Bond nor Dorius made any
representations to Pyper about the redemption process. The facts in Young are simply far more
unfair and overreaching than the facts relied on in the present action.
The Utah Court of Appeals also relied on Pender vs. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644 (Utah 1954).
In Pender, the purchaser knew the judgment for costs could easily have been satisfied from a
levy of the personal property known to the purchaser and which the purchaser was very careful
not to direct the sheriff to levy upon and sell, (emphasis added) Pender at 648. Also, Dowse's
attorney was studiously silent after the quitclaim deed had been received about their intention to
collect the judgment for costs even though they saw [the debtor] and his attorney on several
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occasions before and after the execution sale. In Pender, the debtor was deliberately misled by
the purchaser.
Both of these instances in Pender are again affirmative actions by the purchaser that
directly influenced the sale and impeded the redemption process.
In the present action, neither Bond nor Dorius made any affirmative representations to
induce Pyper to forgo redemption or led Pyper in anyway to believe the redemption period
would not be insisted upon. The facts in the present action simply do not rise to the level of
unfairness as in the cases of Young or Pender.
Having stated that neither Bond or Dorius made any affirmative actions or
representations, the Utah Court of Appeals also reasoned that Bond and Dorius' actions
implicitly represented a willingness to participate in the redemption process.
First, this is unwise precedent. The Utah Court of Appeals is setting a precedent that by
merely answering a debtors phone call and listening to his offer of settlement a purchaser
implicitly represents a willingness to participate in the redemption process. It seems quite
common that debtors routinely contact a purchaser just prior to the end of the redemption period
and try to work out some kind of deal. The Utah Court of Appeals' reasoning that responding to
these contacts implicitly represents a willingness to participate in the redemption process will
greatly frustrate attempts to collect debts. According to the Utah Court of Appeals decision, it
would be better if the purchaser merely ignored the contacts, for if he responds, the purchaser has
now agreed to take part in the redemption process. At the same time, failure to return the phone
calls also seems to be a basis upon which the Utah Court of Appeals found slight circumstances
of unfairness. The Utah Court of Appeals' decision is simply unwise and unnecessarily
complicates the redemption process.
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Second, the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not support an
implicit willingness by Bond and Dorius to participate in the redemption process. The Trial
Court merely found slight circumstances of unfairness existed because Bond and Dorius did not
return Pyper's telephone calls and did not inform him that once the property was sold, the
judgment could not be paid off to redeem the property. The Trial Court did not make any
findings that Bond and Dorius implicitly represented a willingness to participate in the
redemption process.
The Utah Court of Appeals also failed to follow Huston v. Lewis, 818 p.2d 531. (Utah
1991).
Huston is the most recent case dealing with equity regarding Sheriff sales. In Huston, the
debtors petitioned the Trial Court for an extension of the redemption period. The Trial Court
refused the debtor's petition to enlarge the redemption period.
In Huston, this Court then clearly set forth the standard required for extending a sheriff
sale or setting aside a sheriff sale after the redemption period has expired. In Huston, this Court
stated
It is clear that the right of a purchaser at a sheriffs sale either to receive the proper
redemption amount in accordance with Rule 69(f) or to have the title perfected at the end of the
six-month period is a substantative right. Accordingly, strict compliance with the six-month
redemption period is normally required. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we have also
recognized that in exceptional circumstances, a court sitting in equity may extend a redemption
period or set aside a sheriff sale after the period for redemption. However, a court should take
such action only when the equities of the case are compelling and 'move the conscience of the
court.' Huston at 535.

The ruling in Huston clearly requires that the case must be compelling and there be
exceptional circumstances when setting aside a sheriff sale. In the present action, the Utah Court
of Appeals merely found there were slight circumstances of unfairness to Pyper. The Court of
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Appeals did not find there were exceptional circumstances in this case nor were the equities of
this case compelling. The ruling of this Court in Huston requires these two factors.
Nothing is exceptional or compelling about the present action. The sheriff sale was held
on November 9, 2006. Pyper allowed ninety percent of the redemption period to lapse without
doing anything. He then started contacting Bond and Dorius. Pyper stated he needed the lien
removed so that he could obtain a loan. Bond and Dorius refused to remove the lien. Thereafter,
the redemption period expired.
There is nothing exceptional or compelling about these circumstances. In fact, it seems
to be a quite common occurrence for the debtor to ignore the majority of the redemption period
and then scramble at the last minute to make some kind of deal.
The Utah Court of Appeals also stated Bond and Dorius had an obligation not to take
advantage of Pyper's ignorance based on their prior representation. However, this conclusion is
not in line with the facts. Pyper was represented by other counsel during the redemption period
R. 450 page 122-123 and Pyper was clearly not ignorant of the rules as he belatedly tendered
the required funds into the District Court without any assistance from Bond or Dorius.
Bond and Dorius had no obligation to communicate with Pyper in anyway. Pyper should
not be rewarded for this lack of diligence by merely alleging Bond and Dorius failed to return a
few phone calls during the last two weeks of the redemption period. Pyper should also not be
allowed to claim ignorance of the process when he was represented by other counsel during the
redemption period and in fact belatedly tendered the required funds into the District Court.
As stated above, the Utah Court of Appeals misapplied the holdings in both Young and
Pender, and failed to follow the holding in Huston.
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II. The Utah Court of Appeals Decision is Unwise Precedent
The decision by the Utah Court of Appeals is unwise precedent. The slim basis of
unfairness upon which the Utah Court of Appeals made its ruling frustrates the purpose of Rule
69C and frustrates sheriff sales and the redemption process. This ruling will also open the
floodgates of litigation, so that any judgment debtor can attack a sheriff sale at any time after the
end of the redemption period by merely alleging they suffered even the slimmest instances of
unfairness.
There are numerous safeguards afforded to the debtor during the redemption process. As
argued in the dissenting opinion in Pyper v. Bond, now all a judgment debtor need do is sit idly
by for ninety percent of the redemption period and then in the last two weeks, allege the debtor
made several unretumed phone calls. This opens virtually every sheriff sale to attack at anytime
after the redemption period has expired. Pyper v. Bond at paragraph 26.
Furthermore, a purchaser at a sheriff sale is under no obligation to communicate with the
judgment debtor at all. In the present action, Pyper could have easily obtained the necessary
redemption information from the District Court or from his own attorney and exercised his right
to redemption. In fact, Pyper belatedly tendered the required funds into the Court without any
assistance from Bond or Dorius. Pyper could just have easily done this prior to the end of the
redemption period.
The Utah Court of Appeals decision now stands for the proposition that even if a
purchaser makes no affirmative actions or representations during the redemption process, a
judgment debtor can still attack the sale after the redemption period has expired by merely
alleging he made a few unretumed phone calls. This is not what this Court envisioned in Young,
Pender, or Huston. This Court clearly stated in Huston
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we have also recognized that in exceptional circumstances, a court sitting in equity may
extend a redemption period or set aside a sheriff sale after the period for redemption.
However, a court should take such action only when the equities of the case are
compelling and 'move the conscience of the court.'
Huston at 535.
In Huston, this Court clearly stated that setting aside a sheriff sale shall only be used in
exceptional circumstances and when the case is compelling. It is arguable that it is quite
common for a judgment debtor to contact the purchaser just prior to the end of the redemption
period and start making offers or trying to make some kind of deal. According to the Utah Court
of Appeals decision, even unreturned phone calls can now be used as slight circumstances of
unfairness. Also, according to the Utah Court of Appeals decision, responding to those phone
calls now implies a willingness to participate in the redemption process. Again, the Utah Court
of Appeals decision is unwise precedent and is not one of the exceptional circumstances required
by Huston.
Futhermore, in Mollerup vs. Storage Systems International 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977)
this Court stated
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate instances
extend the period. This Court has recognized that equitable principle by setting aside a
sale after the time for redemption had expired, when the sale was attended by such
substantial irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a fair sum, resulting in a gross
sacrifice of the judgment creditor's property.. ..
Mollerup at 1124.

In Mollerup, this Court clearly stated the sale must be attended by "substantial
irregularities." The substantial irregularities referred to in Mollerup are more in tune with the
principles this Court set forth in Young, Pender, and Huston.
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Hundreds of sheriff sales take place every year. The Utah Court of Appeals decision will
open the floodgates of litigation by allowing judgment debtors to attack sheriff sales on even the
slimmest circumstances of alleged unfairness.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals improperly applied the case law in this action. The Court of
Appeals relied on the cases Young and Pender. However, both Young and Pender involved
affirmative actions and affirmative representations by the purchaser in an effort to impeded the
redemption process and mislead the debtor. The Utah Court of Appeals in this action merely
stated that failure to return phone calls in the last two weeks of the redemption period amounts
to slight circumstances of unfairness. Young, Pender, and Huston and Mollerup, all stand for
the proposition that sheriff sales should only be set-aside only in exceptional circumstances and
when the case is compelling. This requires active participation by the purchaser in an effort to
frustrate the sale or mislead the debtor. None of these are present in this action.
Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals' decision sets unwise precedent. According to
the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, any debtor can now attack a sheriff sale after the
expiration of the redemption period by merely alleging there were a few unreturned phone calls.
This will open the floodgates of litigation. The wiser decision would be to affirm the strict
compliance with the statutory redemption period except in exceptional circumstances and when
the case is compelling. The facts in the case are neither exceptional nor compelling.
It seems quite common that a debtor will attempt to contact the purchaser just prior to
the end of the redemption period and try to work out some kind of deal. However, Rule 69C
provides specific instructions on how the process should take place. The Utah Court of Appeals
decision allows debtors to circumvent these processes by alleging they made a few phone calls
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and then attacking the sale after the expiration of the redemption period. This increases
litigation rather than clearly setting forth rules upon which both purchasers and debtors can rely.
Bond and Dorius acted in all ways fair and in accordance with the rules and procedures.
The sale was conducted pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69C and carried out by the
Sanpete County Sheriff. Pyper simply failed to redeem the property within 180-days of the
sale.
Based on the above, this Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals decision.
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
OPINION
(For Official Publication)

David Pyper and Estate of
Mollie Maxine Pyper,
Petitioners and Appellee,

Case No. 20080906-CA
F T Ti E D

v.

(November 13, 2009)

Justin C. Bond, Dale M.
Dorius, and Alison D. Bond,

2009 UT App 331

Respondents and Appellants.

Sixth District, Manti Department, 070600191
The Honorable David L. Mower
Attorneys: Jennifer D. Reyes, Brigham City, for Appellants
J. Bryan Quesenberry, Provo, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Thorne.
THORNE, Judge:
Ifl Justin C. Bond, Dale M. Dorius, and Alison D. Bond
(Respondents) appeal from the district court's final judgment
setting aside a sheriff's sale of real property belonging to
David Pyper. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
12
In 2002, Pyper hired attorney Justin C. Bond to represent
him in a probate matter.1 At that time, Bond was employed by the
law firm of Dorius, Bond, Reyes, and Linares (DBR&L). Bond's
representation of Pyper resulted in attorney fees slightly in
excess of $9000, which Pyper failed to pay.

\Alison D. Bond's interest in this matter is solely as the
ultimate transferee of an interest in the subject property. All
further references to Bond refer only to Justin C. Bond.

13
Bond sued Pyper to obtain payment of the fees, and on March
1, 2006, the district court entered a judgment in Bond's favor in
the amount of $10,577.23. To satisfy this judgment, Bond levied
against a house (the property) belonging to Pyper. A properly
noticed sheriff's sale of the property took place on November 9,
2006, and Bond was the only bidder to attend the sale. Bond
purchased the property for a $329 bid that was credited to his
judgment against Pyper.
14
At the time of the sale, the property was worth
approximately $125,000. There was a mortgage against the
property of approximately $40,000 to $50,000. Thus, a
conservative estimate of Pyper's equity in the property at the
time of the sale is $75,000. Bond was aware of at least the
existence of the mortgage when he placed his winning bid on the
property.
15
Pyper wanted to redeem the property, and on April 20, 2007,
he called DBR&L and asked for a judgment lien payoff amount. No
one called him back. On April 25, he again called DBR&L and
spoke with Dorius, another DBR&L attorney.2 Pyper and Dorius
discussed terms for satisfying the judgment against Pyper, and
Dorius informed Pyper that Dorius needed to talk to Bond about
it. Thereafter, Pyper called DBR&L every day, making
approximately twenty-eight phone calls with no response from
either Bond or Dorius.
16
On or about May 8, the 180-day time period for redemption of
the property under rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
expired. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(d). On May 16, a sheriff's
deed was issued, transferring the property to Bond. On May 17,
Bond and Pyper spoke about satisfying the judgment. Bond
informed Pyper that Dorius was in charge of the judgment and told
Pyper that Bond would call Pyper back, but that did not happen.
Pyper continued calling Bond and Dorius on a near-daily basis
through May 30.
17
On May 30, Pyper's present counsel called Dorius to request
a payoff amount. Dorius promised Pyper's counsel that he would
get back to him by the end of the week, but again, that did not
happen. After about two weeks of more unreturned phone calls,
Pyper's counsel sent Dorius a letter regarding the matter.
Respondents' counsel replied by letter stating that the
redemption period had expired. On or about June 26, Pyper paid

2

Bond was no longer employed by DBR&L at this time.
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$349.27 to the district court in an attempt to comply with rule
69C, see id. R. 69C(e)-(f) (setting redemption price and allowing
for payment of disputed price to the court), and filed his
Petition to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale and to Redeem Property.
Respondents opposed Pyper's petition on the ground that the
redemption period had expired.
f8
On June 23, 2008, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing at which Bond, Dorius, and Pyper all testified.
Thereafter, the district court issued its memorandum decision
setting aside the sheriff's sale of the property. Among the
district court's findings were that the sale price of the
property was "grossly inadequate" such that it "shocks the
conscience of an impartial mind" and "an honest man would
hesitate to take advantage of it." The district court further
found that Bond's and Dorius's actions amounted to at least
"'slight circumstances of unfairness'" to Pyper. The district
court then concluded that the gross inadequacy of the sales
price, together with Bond's and Dorius's unfair actions, gave the
court the equitable power to set aside the sheriff's sale despite
the expiration of the redemption period. Respondents appeal from
the final order implementing the memorandum decision.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
If9 Respondents argue that the district court misconstrued
existing case law governing its equitable power to set aside a
sheriff's sale and, thus, erred in setting aside the sale of the
property after the time period for redemption had expired.
Respondents' argument presents a question of law that we review
for correctness. See Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, 1f 6,
169 P.3d 441 ("[T]he district court's interpretation of prior
precedent, statutes, and the common law are questions of law that
we review for correctness.").
ANALYSIS
1fl0 It is long established in Utah law that "a court, sitting in
equity, may in appropriate instances extend the [redemption]
period." See Mollerup v. Storage Svs. Int'l, 569 P.2d 1122, 1124
(Utah 1977); see also Young v. Schroeder, 10 Utah 155, 37 P. 252
(1894), aff'd, 161 U.S. 334 (1896). Equitable extension of the
redemption period, if justified by the circumstances, may take
place either before or after the expiration of the redemption
period. See Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1991)
("[I]n exceptional circumstances, a court sitting in equity may
extend a redemption period or set aside a sheriff's sale after
the period for redemption." (footnote omitted)). However, "a
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court should take such an action only when the equities of the
case are compelling and move the conscience of the court." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Respondents argue that this
case does not present the exceptional circumstances required to
allow the setting aside of the sheriff's sale of the property
after the expiration of the redemption period and that the
district court erred when it interpreted existing case law to
allow such a result.
1111 The seminal Utah case on equitable extension of redemption
periods is Young v. Schroeder, 10 Utah 155, 37 P. 252 (1894),
aff'd, 161 U.S. 334 (1896). Respondents argue that Young
established a two-part test for equitable extensions: (1) "gross
inadequacy of price" and (2) "irregularities attending the sale."
See id. at 254. Respondents further argue that the district
court failed to apply the second prong of the Young test and
relied solely on inadequacy of price to set aside the sale of the
property. We accept Respondents' two-part test as a general
statement of the appropriate method for establishing the district
court's authority to grant equitable extensions.3 However, we
disagree both with Respondents' argument that the district court
failed to apply both prongs of the test and with Respondents'
narrow interpretation of the irregularities prong.
H12 It is clear that the district court considered both
inadequacy of price and irregularities attending the sale in
rendering its decision. Quoting Young, the district court made
the following statement regarding irregularities attending the
sale:
A moving party is not required to prove fraud
in the purchase of property for an inadequate
price. "Slight circumstances of unfairness
in the conduct of the party benefited by the
sale" are enough to raise "the presumption of
fraud." Therefore, the [c]ourt should
consider any unfairness in the conduct of a
purchasing party.

3

We express no opinion on whether Respondents' two-part test
represents the exclusive avenue for a district court to extend
the redemption period.
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(Citations omitted.)4 T h e district court further concluded,
again using the language of Young, that Bond's and Dorius's
actions "amount[ed] to 'slight circumstances of unfairness' to
[Pyper]" and that "[g]reat inadequacy of price coupled with
unfairness raise[s] a presumption of fraud on Respondents'
behalf." Thus, Respondents are incorrect when they argue that
the district court failed to consider Young's irregularity prong
before setting aside the sale of the property.5
Respondents argue that the language quoted by the district
court comes not from the holding of Young, but rather from
Young's quotation of an even earlier case, Graffam v. Burgess,
117 U.S. 180 (1886). See Young v. Schroeder, 10 Utah 155, 37 P.
252, 254 (1894), aff'd, 161 U.S. 334 (1896). While Respondents
are correct that the quoted language does not come directly from
Young's holding, we note that Young quoted Graffam favorably.
See id. We further note that the Utah Supreme Court has
subsequently repeated—and emphasized—the same Graffam language
employed in Young and by the district court. See Pender v.
Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644, 648 (1954) ("'Great
inadequacy reguires only slight circumstances of unfairness in
the conduct of the party benefited by the sale to raise the
presumption of fraud.'" (quoting Graffam, 117 U.S. at 192)).
5

We note that, contrary to Respondents' argument, Young did
not absolutely foreclose the possibility of equitable extension
of a redemption period based solely on inadequacy of price. On
this subject, the Young court stated,
It is insisted by appellants that mere
inadequacy of price, however gross, will not
authorize the courts to set aside a judicial
sale. The general rule undoubtedly is that
mere inadequacy of price, alone, does not
authorize the disturbance of such a sale; but
we are not prepared to sanction the
unqualified statement of the rule as put by
appellants' counsel. If the inadequacy is so
gross as at once to shock the conscience of
all fair and impartial minds, if the
sacrifice is such that every honest man would
hesitate to take advantage of it, it may well
be doubted whether every such case would be
beyond the power of a court of equity to
relieve against.
Young, 37 P. at 254; accord Pender, 265 P.2d at 648 (quoting from
Young).
We do not disagree with the district court's determinations
that the sale of Pyper's $75,000 of equity in the property for
(continued...)
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113 Having concluded that the district court applied both prongs
of the Young test, we turn to the question of whether it did so
properly under the circumstances• The two-part test urged by
Respondents is distilled from a larger quote from Young:
All the cases unite in the doctrine that on
gross inadequacy of price, coupled with
irregularities attending the sale, especially
where such irregularities are not merely
formal and technical, but such as have a
direct tendency to prevent the realizing of a
fair price for the property sold, and are
attributable to the purchaser at the sale, it
is the duty of the courts to set the sale
aside, unless the complaining party is
estopped by his own laches•
37 P. at 254. The district court's ruling expressly found such
an inadequacy of price. And, although couched in terms of
circumstances of unfairness,6 the district court also made
findings pertaining to Bond's and Dorius's interactions with
Pyper regarding redemption after the sale had occurred.
Respondents argue that the circumstances of unfairness found by
the district court do not constitute irregularities attending the
sale for purposes of the Young analysis. We disagree.
IF 14 Respondents argue that Young' s "irregularities attending the
sale," see id., must be irregularities in the sale itself, not
the redemption process. But this reading ignores the underlying
facts in Young. There were, to be sure, irregularities with the
sale itself in Young, but the court also relied on the
5

(...continued)
$32 9 both "shocks the conscience of an impartial mind" and was
"[such a] sacrifice of [Pyper's] property . . . that an honest
man would hesitate to take advantage of it." Thus, if we were
inclined to make an exception to the general rule that inadequacy
of price alone is insufficient, this case would appear to be a
candidate for such an exception. We do not, however, elect to
decide the case on this basis.
6

We note that the district court obtained the phrase "slight
circumstances of unfairness" from the Young decision, where it is
located in the sentence immediately preceding the language cited
by Respondents as the source of their two-part test. See 37 P.
at 254 ("'Great inadequacy requires only slight circumstances of
unfairness in the conduct of the party benefited by the sale to
raise the presumption of fraud.' All the Ccises unite . . . ."
(quoting Graffam, 117 U.S. at 192)).
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purchasers' conduct after the sale. In particular, prior to the
expiration of the redemption period, the Young purchasers assured
the debtor "that the statutory period would not be insisted
upon." Id. at 256. While there are no such affirmative
representations in the instant case, Young nevertheless relied,
in part, on post-sale events to reach the equitable result of
setting aside the sale.
fl5 We also find support for the district court's ruling in a
somewhat more recent case, Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265
P.2d 644 (1954). In Pender, a judgment creditor purchased real
property worth about $8000 for $47.46 to satisfy a judgment of
$22.80. See id. at 646. After the redemption period had
expired, the judgment debtor petitioned the district court to set
aside the sale. The district court did so, relying on the great
inadequacy of price and two additional factors: (1) the
creditor's failure to levy upon and sell the debtor's personal
property, which was known to the creditor and of sufficient value
to easily cover the judgment, and (2) the creditor and his
attorney's "studious silence" about their intent to collect the
judgment, despite repeated contact with the debtor and his
attorney both before and after the execution sale. See id. at
648. Neither of these circumstances can be characterized as
irregularities in the sale itself, which was apparently properly
noticed and conducted. See id. at 646. Nevertheless, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that the
creditors' actions "justified the [district] court in concluding
the sale was attended by unfairness and was tainted with fraud."
Id. at 648.
fl6 We conclude that the district court's ruling here comports
with the principles applied in Young and Pender. The inadequacy
of the price that Respondents paid for the property is very
great. And we cannot disagree that Bond's and Dorius's actions
present some circumstances of unfairness toward Pyper, however
slight, relating to the sale of the property. The district court
found that Pyper asked DBR&L for a judgment lien pay-off amount
more than two weeks before the expiration of the redemption
period and actually spoke with Dorius about the matter on April
25, 2007. By the time the redemption period expired on May 8,
Pyper had made at least a dozen unanswered phone calls to DBR&L
regarding redemption of the property. As in Pender, these calls
were met only with "studious silence." See id. After the
expiration date, Bond and Dorius continued to lead Pyper to
believe that they were working toward redemption of the property
until early June 2007, when counsel for Respondents informed
Pyper that the redemption period had expired. Pyper petitioned
the district court promptly thereafter.
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U17 Pyper did not, in fact, need Bond and Dorius's assistance in
order to redeem the property. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(f)
(allowing for commencement of the redemption process despite a
dispute over the redemption price). However, Pyper*s
conversation with and repeated phone calls to Dorius prior to the
expiration of the redemption period placed Respondents on
reasonable notice that Pyper was not aware that he could initiate
redemption without their participation. As Pyper's former
counsel, Bond and Dorius had some obligation not to take
advantage of Pyper's known ignorance.7 Cf. Kilpatrick v. Wiley,
Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, IfH 52-53, 37 P.3d 1130 (discussing
continuing nature of attorney's duties of confidentiality and
loyalty after termination of attorney-client relationship).
Their doing so, combined with the very great inadequacy in
purchase price, justifies the district court's setting aside of
the sheriff's sale in this case. See generally Pender, 265 P.2d
at 648 ("Great inadequacy requires only slight circumstances of
unfairness in the conduct of the party benefited by the sale to
raise the presumption of fraud." (emphasis and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
tl8 Despite our conclusion, we are not unsympathetic to
Respondents' argument that Utah law provides many other
safeguards to protect judgment debtors and that because of such
safeguards, courts should be reluctant to extend redemption
periods. In particular, rule 69C(f) prevents creditors from
obstructing the redemption process by refusing to participate
therein. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(f) (addressing disputes over
redemption price); Granada, Inc. v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254, 256
(Utah 1985) ("The intent of [former] Rule 69(f)(3) is to allow a
redemptioner to pay the funds into court so that the holder of
the certificate of sale cannot clog the equity of redemption by
refusing to cooperate in the redemption process."). In light of
rule 69C(f), we decline to recognize any duty on the part of a
sheriff's sale purchaser to affirmatively cooperate with an
attempted redemption. Here, however, Bond's and Dorius's words
and actions represented, at least implicitly, that they were
7

Bond's and Dorius's status as attorneys is of some
relevance to this case. In Young, the court stated, "A purchase
by an attorney for his own benefit at a sale over which he has
exercised any direction or control should always be closely
scrutinized by the court." 37 P. at 255-56.
Young also allowed for late redemption against one attorney
based on representations made by the attorney's law partner. See
id. at 256. This latter aspect of Young eases any concerns we
might otherwise have had with disturbing Bond's purchase based on
Dorius's actions, where Bond himself made no unfair statements to
Pyper until after the redemption period had expired.
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going to participate in the redemption process. It is their
failure to act in accordance with this representation that
justifies the district court's finding of unfairness warranting
relief.
If 19 Respondents also argue that affirming the district court's
ruling in this case will make it almost impossible to effectively
lien property to collect a judgment because "every creditor would
have to analyze their purchase price against the value of the
property being sold to determine whether there is a gross
inadequacy of price." This argument rests on Respondents'
erroneous reading of the district court's judgment as extending
Pyper's redemption period based solely on inadequacy of price.
As explained above, the district court properly relied on both
inadequacy of price and the unfair actions of Bond and Dorius
when it allowed Pyper's untimely redemption of the property.
Thus, creditors and other purchasers at sheriff's sales can
ensure the ultimate finality of their purchases either by bidding
a reasonably adequate price to begin with or, failing that, by
scrupulously avoiding unfair treatment of the debtor. These
options are long-established by existing case law, see generally
Young v. Schroeder, 10 Utah 155, 37 P. 252 (1894), aff'd, 161
U.S. 334 (1896), and we reject Respondents' contention that
affirming the district court's judgment will frustrate the
collections process.
CONCLUSION
f20 We conclude that the district court possessed the equitable
power to set aside the sheriff's sale of the property after the
expiration of the redemption period. Although this is a close
case, the district court found both great inadequacy of the sales
price and slight circumstances of unfairness on the part of Bond
and Dorius. Together, these findings served to vest the district
court with the authority to set aside the sale under prior
precedents. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1f2l I CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge
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DAVIS, Judge (dissenting):
H22 I dissent from the majority opinion. I cannot agree that
the circumstances here were sufficient to constitute the
"exceptional circumstances" required for disturbing a sheriffs
sale, see Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1991).
1T23 First, as recognized by the majority, there was no
irregularity in the sale itself. And even if my colleagues are
correct that the term "irregularities attending the sale" can
include a purchaser's conduct after the sale, I do not agree that
such irregularities were present here. Indeed, the two cases
relied on for this point involve some kind of affirmative actions
or representations directly aimed at impeding redemption, not the
mere failure to do something as minor as return telephone calls.
See Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d, 265 P.2d 644, 648 (1954) (relying
on "the facts that [the purchaser] knew that the judgment for
costs could easily have been satisfied from a levy of personal
property known by him to be owned by [the debtor], and which he
was very careful not to direct the sheriff to levy upon and sell,
plus his and his attorney's studious silence after the quitclaim
deed had been received about their intention to collect the
judgment for costs even though they saw rthe debtor] and his
attorney on several occasions before and after the execution
sale" (emphases added)); Young v. Schroeder, 10 Utah 155, 37 P.
252, 256 (1894) ("[T]he plaintiff was assured by [the purchaser],
before the period for redemption had expired, that the statutory
period would not be insisted upon[.]" (emphasis added)), aff'd,
161 U.S. 334 (1896). Had Bond or Dorius made some sort of
affirmative representation to induce Pyper to forgo redemption, I
would be inclined to concur in part with the decision reached by
the majority. But I simply do not believe that Bond and Dorius's
alleged omission in not returning telephone calls rises even to
"slight circumstances of unfairness," see Young, 37 P. at 254.
See generally Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1288
(1986) (defining "unfair" as "marked by injustice, partiality, or
deception").x
x

The majority reasons that Bond and Dorius's actions
implicitly represented a willingness to participate in the
redemption process. See supra H 18. I do not agree, and in any
event, I disagree that any such implicit message would be
sufficient to meet the standard here. More importantly, the
majority's reasoning about an implicit representation is not
supported by the findings and conclusions of the district court.
Instead, the district court simply determined that irregularities
existed because "[Bond and Dorius] did not return [Pyper]'s
(continued...)
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124 Moreover, a purchaser at a sheriff's sale is under no
obligation to communicate with the judgment debtor at all—a
point that the majority apparently concedes, see supra 1 18. And
I do not see that Bond and Dorius's position as Pyper's former
counsel changes this rule, particularly under these
circumstances. Although duties of confidentiality and loyalty
continue beyond representation, I do not see how this requires
Bond and Dorius to ascertain and correct Pyper's
misunderstandings of the legal process, particularly when Pyper
was both aware that there was some deadline for redeeming the
property and was, apparently, represented by different legal
counsel. Pyper could have easily obtained the necessary
redemption information from the district court and could have
paid the court in order to exercise his right of redemption, all
without any assistance from Bond and Dorius. Indeed, he
eventually, although belatedly, did just that.
125 Absent an irregularity of a nature heretofore described, the
low bid is irrelevant. Indeed, the remedy for such a low-ball
bid is the right of redemption, which a judgment debtor has six
months to exercise. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69C. Thus, the very
fact that the amount of the bid was so low actually benefitted
Pyper. He had six months to tender a mere $329 to redeem his
property, thereby rendering it unavailable to satisfy the
judgment, yet he failed to do so.
126 In sum, this case sets unwise precedent. Now all a judgment
debtor need do to have the sheriff's sale set aside is, after
sitting idly by for ninety percent of the redemption period,
allege that he made several unreturned telephone calls in the
final two weeks and, any time after the sheriff's deed is
delivered, attack the sale. Under the reasoning of the majority,
virtually any sheriff's sale is now vulnerable, as is the
sheriff's deed and any deeds to subsequent grantees. I would
therefore reverse the decision of the district court.

James Z. Davis, Judge

l

(...continued)
telephone calls and did not inform him that once the property was
sold, the judgment could not be paid off to redeem the property."
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DAVID PYPER and ESTATE OF MOLLIE
MAXINE PYPER,
Petitioners,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(INCLUDING FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW)

vs.

Case No. 070600191

JUSTIN C. BOND, ALISON D. BOND, and
DALEM.DORJUS,

Assigned Judge- DAVID L. MOWER

Respondents.
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on June 23, 2008. Petitioner David
Pyper was present and represented by his attorney J. Bryan Quesenberry. Respondents were also
present and represented by their attorney Jennifer D. Reyes.
Based on the testimony of witnesses and exhibits, the Court now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Sometime in 2002, David Pyper hired Justin Bond to represent him in a probate matter .

2.

At that time, Justin Bond was employed by the law firm of DORIUS, BOND, REYES &
LINARES.

3.

Mr. Pyper incurred attorney's fees to Mr. Bond in the amount of $9,064.82.

4.

Mr. Pyper failed to pay the fees.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (INCLUDING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW), Case number 070600191,
Page - 2 5.

Mr. Bond then filed a separate case in order to collect his attorney's fees2.

6.

A judgment of $ 10,577.23 was entered in favor of Justin Bond and against David Pyper
on March 1,2006.

7.

On August 8, 2006, Mr. Bond obtained a Writ of Execution to collect on the judgment.

8.

He also filed a Notice of Levy on Sanpete County property described as Parcel
#16686X19, all of Lot 18, Brotherson Subdivision, Plat "A" Mt. Pleasant Survey, Cont.
.39 AC.

9.

This property is a house that belonged to David Pyper.
a.

This house is approximately fifteen to sixteen hundred square feet.

b.

It sits on a one-half acre lot.

c.

The house was appraised in 2006. The appraiser valued the house in the range of
$125,000.00 to $127,764.00.

10.

The Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on September 12,2006.

11.

A Sheriffs sale took place on November 9,2006.

12.

Justin Bond attended the sale. No one else was there except for the Sheriff.

13.

Justin Bond made an opening bid of $329.00.

14.

He and the Sheriff waited for someone else to make another bid.

15.

No one else made another bid.

2

Case number 040600419 in this Court.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (INCLUDING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
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Page - 3 16.

The Sheriff closed the sale and announced that the property was sold to Justin Bond for
$329.00.

17.

Justin Bond did not pay any cash for the property because the sale price of $329.00 was
less than the amount of his judgment.

18.

At the time of sale, Justin Bond knew that there was a mortgage on this property in the
amount of approximately $40,000.00 to $50,000.00.

19.

At that time, there were also several liens on the house. David Pyper was able to clear
those liens in April of 2007. (See Exhibit 4 Deed of Reconveyance from Wells Fargo
Bank).

20.

David Pyper wanted to redeem the property from the Sheriffs sale.

21.

On April 20, 2007, he called the office of the law firm of DORIUS, BOND, REYES &
LINARES asking for a judgment lien pay-off amount.

22.

He was not able to speak with any of the attorneys and was told that the firm would call
him back.

23.

No one called him back. On April 25, 2007, he made another phone call to the law firm
and spoke with attorney Dale Dorius. (At that time, Mr. Bond was no longer employed
with this law firm.)

24.

Mr. Pyper testified as follows about the April 25, 2007 conversation with Mr. Dorius:

MEMORANDUM DECISION (INCLUDING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW), Case number 070600191,
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Mr. Pyper explained that he had a bank loan in place and also another source of
money to pay Mr. Dorius's firm for the judgment.

b.

Mr. Pyper asked about the amount of judgment lien pay-off.

c.

Mr. Dorius in turn asked him what would be a fair amount.

d.

Mr. Pyper said that $8,500.00 would be fair.

e.

Mr. Dorius told Mr. Pyper that Mr. Dorius wanted to check the file and also talk to
Mr. Bond about it.

25.

Mr. Dorius testified as follows about this same conversation:
a.

Mr. Dorius remembered that Mr. Pyper offered $8,500.00 to satisfy the judgment.

b.

Mr. Pyper also said that he needed Mr. Dorius to release a lien on the house in
order for Mr. Pyper to obtain funds through a bank loan.

c.

Mr. Dorius was concerned about releasing a lien on the house. He told Mr. Pyper
he needed to talk to Mr. Bond about it.

26.

Thereafter, Mr. Pyper called Mr. Dorius' office every day. He made approximately 28
phone calls. In one of the phone calls, he asked for Mr. Bond's number because he was
not getting anywhere with Mr. Dorius.

27.

On May 16, 2007, a Sheriffs Deed was issued transferring the house to Mr. Bond.

28.

On May 17,2007, Mr. Pyper spoke with Mr. Bond.

29.

He told Mr. Bond that he had money to pay his judgment off.
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Mr. Bond said that Mr. Dorius was in charge of that judgment.

31.

He then said that he and Mr. Dorius needed to get together and figure out the amount of
pay-off.

32.

He told Mr. Pyper that he would call him back.

33.

Mr. Bond did not call back.

34.

Mr. Bond remembered this conversation with Mr. Pyper. He also remembered talking to
Mr. Dorius about Mr. Pyper's request. Mr. Bond and Mr Dorius agreed that they would
not be willing to release the lien on the property.

35.

Mr. Bond remembered that he rejected Mr. Pyper's offer of releasing the lien on the
house.

36.

Mr. Pyper kept calling both Mr. Dorius and Mr. Bond until May 30, 2007. He called
almost every day.

37.

On May 30, 2007, Mr. Pyper called his attorney and told him that he could not get the
pay-off amount from either Mr. Dorius or from Mr. Bond.

38.

On May 30,2007, Mr. Quesenberry, Mr. Pyper's attorney, called Mr. Dorius and asked
for a pay-off amount.

39.

Mr. Dorius promised to get back to him by the end of the week.

40.

It did not happen.
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Mr. Quesenberry made more phone calls to Mr. Dorius. He left messages. The phone
calls were never returned.

42.

About two weeks after the initial phone call on May 30, 2007, Mr. Quesenberry sent a
letter to Mr. Dorius.

43.

Ms. Reyes prepared a response on behalf of Mr. Dorius. In her letter she informed Mr.
Quesenberry that the redemption period had expired.

44.

Mr. Pyper explained that he called the law firm to get a pay-off amount because he did
not know the exact amount. He thought that some interest might have been added to the
original amount.

45.

Mr. Pyper knew that there was a deadline for redeeming the property. He did not know
when the deadline was.

46.

In the first part of June of 2007, Mr. Pyper paid a redemption sum of $329.50 to the Court
in an attempt to follow Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69C.
ANALYSIS AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
The preliminary issue to consider in this case is Mr. Quesenberry's ability to act both as a

lawyer and a witness. Under Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7, a lawyer "shall not act as
advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness" except for in limited
circumstances. Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, Chapter 13. One of the
circumstances is when the lawyer's testimony relates to an uncontested issue.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (INCLUDING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
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Page - 7 In this case, Mr. Quesenberry's testimony was about phone calls made and a letter written
to Mr. Dorius's office. The Respondents did not contest this testimony. Thus, Mr. Quesenberry is
permitted to act both as a lawyer and a witness. His testimony is considered in making a decision
in this case.
Petitioner in this case failed to follow the redemption rules and let the redemption period
expire. Petitioner now asks the Court to set aside November 9, 2006 Sheriffs sale.
The Court has equitable power to set the sale aside even if a party failed to follow the
redemption rules and let the redemption period expire. Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah
1991); Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122, 1124 (Utah 1977); Young v.
Schroeder, 37 P. 252 (Utah 1894).
The following circumstances must be present for the Court to set a sale aside. First, the
sale price should be inadequate. Young at 254. The inadequacy should be "so gross as ... to
shock the conscience of all fair and impartial minds." Id. The sale at such price should appear to
be a sacrifice of the debtor's property such that "every honest man would hesitate to take
advantage of it." Id.
A moving party is not required to prove fraud in the purchase of property for an
inadequate price. Id. "Slight circumstances of unfairness in the conduct of the party benefited by
the sale" are enough to raise "the presumption of fraud." Id. Therefore, the Court should consider
any unfairness in the conduct of a purchasing party.
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In this case, the sale price was grossly inadequate. At the time of the sale the house and
the lot were worth from $125,000.00 to $127,764.00. Even assuming that there was a mortgage
on the house in the amount of $50,000.00, the equity in the house was from $75,000.00 to
$77,764.00. Mr. Bond bought this property for $329.00 to satisfy a judgment of $10,577.23.
This inadequacy of purchase price satisfies the requirement of Young as it shocks the
conscience of an impartial mind. At 254. The sacrifice of the Petitioner's property is also such
that an honest man would hesitate to take advantage of it. Id.
Additional evidence was presented that both Mr. Dorius and Mr. Bond did not return
Petitioner's telephone calls and did not inform him that once the property was sold, the judgment
could not be paid off to redeem the property. A day after the issuance of Sheriffs Deed to Mr.
Bond, Mr. Bond told the Petitioner that he and Mr. Dorius needed to calculate the amount of
judgment lien pay off.
At that time, Mr. Bond knew that he was the owner of the property and could satisfy his
judgment by selling the property.
Mr. Dorius's and Mr. Bond's actions amount to "slight circumstances of unfairness" to
the Petitioner. Id. Great inadequacy of price coupled with unfairness raise a presumption of fraud
on Respondents' behalf.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (INCLUDING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
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Page - 9 I conclude that the Court has equitable power in this case to set the sale aside. The
November 9, 2006 Sheriffs sale should be set aside. The Court Clerk should return to Petitioner
the $329.50 that he paid into the Court.
Based on these findings of fact and analysis, the Court enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has equitable power to set aside the November 9, 2006 Sheriffs sale in this
case.

2.

The sale was made at a grossly inadequate price coupled with circumstances showing
unfairness to the Petitioner.

3.

The November 9, 2006 Sheriffs sale is set aside.
Mr. Quesenberry is appointed to draft an order implementing this decision.
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DAVID PYPER and ESTATE OF MOLLIE
MAXDSfEPYPER,

ORDER
Case No. 070600191

Petitioners,

Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER

vs.
JUSTIN C. BOND, ALISON D. BOND, and
DALE M. DORIUS,
Respondents.

WHEREFORE, having conducted a bench trial in this matter on June 23, 2008 and
having ruled on this dispute in a September 2,2008 Memorandum Decision (Including Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters this order:
1- The November 9, 2006 Sheriffs Sale is set aside.
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David L. Mower
District Court Judge
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I Appealed to the Supreme court of the United States, July 3 1 , 1894.
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June 4, 1894, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [ * * * l ] APPEAL from the district court of the third judicial district, Hon. G. W. Bartch,
Judge.
Action by John M. Young against A. T. Schroeder and wife to obtain a decree adjudging certain deeds,
executed by the U.S. marshal pursuant to certain execution sales, to be fraudulent, and that the plaintiff be
permitted to redeem from such sales, notwithstanding the statutory time for redemption had expired, and
that the defendants be required to convey to him the property mentioned and described in said deeds.
From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff debtor filed suit against defendant
adjudging certain deeds to be fraudulent and an order that the debtor
property and that the attorneys be required to convey the property to
Judicial District (Utah), entered a decree for the debtor. The attorneys

attorneys to obtain a decree
be permitted to redeem the
him. The District Court, Third
appealed.

OVERVIEW: A corporation obtained a default judgment against the debtor in the amount of about $
1,600. The attorneys represented the corporation in that suit. The debtor and his sister obtained
property as tenants in common. The property was worth $ 25,000. An execution was later issued to a
U.S. marshal, directing him to levy on sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment. The marshal
attached and levied on all the debtor's property after being unable to find personal property. The
attorneys purchased two lots for themselves at the execution sales. The attorneys told the debtor that
the statutory time for redemption would not be insisted upon. As a result, the debtor allowed the period
for redemption to lapse. Before bringing suit, the debtor offered to pay the attorneys the full amount of
the corporation's judgment against him, but they refused. On appeal, the court held that the district
court properly awarded the debtor relief because not only was there a gross inadequacy of price, the
record showed that the attorneys, who became purchasers, so directed and controlled the officer
charged with the duty of executing the writ as to lead to a sacrifice of the debtor's property.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the district court's decree.

CORE TERMS: feet, parcel, marshal, irregularity, thence, levy, redemption, purchaser, levied, thence
north, inadequacy, sacrifice, partition, thence east, plat, judgment debtor, cotenant, deed, inadequacy of
price, expired, decree, corner, block, judgment creditor, fair price, execution sales, attended, insisted,
redeem, notice
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the rights of the other cotenants. But in the case of an involuntary transfer of property, the
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purchase by an attorney for his own benefit at a sale over which he has exercised any
direction or control should always be closely scrutinized by the court. Public policy and the
analogies of the law require that they should be considered per se as in the twilight between
legal fraud and fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the debtor, upon slight
additional facts.
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L. EXECUTION SALE.-IRREGULARITIES.--EQUITABLE RELIEF.-ESTOPPEL IN PAIS.-SEMBLE.-When land
vorth $ 26,000, is sold in separate parcels to satisfy a judgment of $ 1,700, and the purchasers at all the
execution sales except one are the attorneys of the judgment creditor, and that to the extent of furnishing
he officer with descriptions of the property to be levied upon and sold, they directed and controlled the
)rocesses of the court and directed and required the officer to levy upon and sell the property in such
)arcels as rendered it impossible to realize at the sale a fair price, but led to a sacrifice of the debtor's
3roperty, such sales will be set aside and the judgment debtor allowed to redeem on an equitable basis
>ven after the statutory time for redemption has expired, especially when the sales were attended with
nany and serious irregularities for which the parties claiming through the sales were responsible, and when
)ne of the attorneys of the judgment creditor assured the judgment debtor that the statutory period of
•edemption would not be insisted upon, who relied upon this assurance and allowed the period of
•edemption to elapse. Semble, that the conduct of one member of a firm or copartnership not a party to
he suit, about a matter not within the general scope of the partnership business, sufficient to create an
estoppel against him, operates so as to bind another member of the firm sought to be charged, who had no
cnowledge of and did not participate in the acts creating the estoppel.
I. ID.-ID.-GROSS INADEQUACY OF PRICE.-LACHES.-Courts will set aside execution sales when it
appears that the price obtained was grossly inadequate, and that the sales were coupled with irregularities,
not merely formal and technical, but such as have a direct tendency to prevent the realizing of a fair price
"or the property sold, when such irregularities are attributable to the purchasers at the sales, unless the
:omplaining party is estopped by his own laches.
3. ID.-ID.-EXCESSIVE LEVY.-VOID SALE.-Where an execution was issued and the officer levied it upon
and sold certain property of the judgment debtor and returned it into court unsatisfied to the amount of $
L36, and another execution was issued which the officer levied upon certain other property of the judgment
jebtor, which he afterwards sold to satisfy the alleged balance of $ 136, and after deducting his fees,
expenses and commissions therefrom amounting to $ 30, paid the balance, $ 106, to the attorneys of the
udgment creditor, when in fact, there was only $ 25.57 due at the time of issuing the last execution. Held,
:hat this was not an irregularity, merely such as would render the sale voidable, but the levy and sale being
excessive, the sale was absolutely void.
COUNSEL: Messrs. Rawlins & Critchlow and Messrs. Jones & Schroeder, for appellants.
The court erred in permitting plaintiff to testify about a conversation had with Stephens relative to the
•edemption of the property. Stephens is not a party to the suit, and it related to a matter foreign to the
scope of the partnership business. At the time plaintiff did not know that either Stephens or Schroeder had
3ny interest in or control over the property. Jackson v. Bartless, 8 Johns. 381; 4 L. Ed. 57; Anderson v.

Tompkins, 1 Fed. Cas. 8 5 1 , No. 365. The mere relation of j o i n t ownership of property is not enough to
constitute each owner [ * * * 2 ] the agent of the other to bind him by fraud. 1 Bige. on Fraud, 223. Plaintiff
and his cotenants had divided the land into distinct lots, and a conveyance of all plaintiffs interest in any
one lot is valid and effectual against his cotenants. Freeman on Coten. 282, § 2 0 8 ; Butler v. Roys, 25 Mich.
53; S. C. 12 A m . Rep. 218; Jackson v. Newton, 18 Johns. 355.
The court found that at the date of the first sale, Stephens did not know of the existence of any other
property, and then in another finding that he had formed an intention to exhaust all of plaintiffs property.
Inconsistent findings will not sustain a judgment. Reese v. Corcoran, 52 Cal, 4 9 5 ; Manley v. Howlet, 55
Cal. 94; Harris v. Harris, 59 Cal. 116; Kloss v. Alleman, 64 Cal. 87. There were three separate sales under
two different executions. The court cannot grant entire relief in one action unless there was a common
fraudulent intent as to all. Finding 10 makes such intent impossible. 2 Comp. Laws, § 3220; Wallen v.
Ruskan, 12 How. Pr. 28; Henderson v. Jackson, 40 How. Pr. 168. As long as a judicial sale stands, the
purchase price as between the parties is a conclusive test of its value. Snyder v. Blair, 33 N. J. Eg.
[ * * * 3 ] 208. Where there is a conflict of evidence on material issues, the finding of the court is not
conclusive on appeal, like the verdict of a jury or the finding of a common law court, and the supreme court
will review the facts as well as the law. Kelley v. Carker, 55 Ark. 112; S. C. 17 S. W. R. 7 0 6 ; Cheney v.
Roodhouse, 135 Ills. 25: Droster v. Mueller, 103 Mo. 6 2 4 ; U. S. v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 4 2 7 ; 37 L. Ed.
587. Fraud on the part of the purchaser must be shown, in addition to inadequacy of consideration.
Simmons v. Vandegrift, 1 N. J. Eg. 55. There must be fraud to give a court of equity jurisdiction.
Irregularity is not sufficient. Cavanaugh v. Jakeway, Walker Ch. 344; Hansford v. Barber, 3 A. K. Smith,
515. Some knowledge and participation in the act claimed to be fraudulent must be proved upon the party
sought to be charged. The mere relationship of joint ownership to the property is not enough to constitute
each owner the agent of the other to bind him by false representations in an unauthorized sale of the whole
property.' Bige. on Fraud, 223; Holmes v. Wood, 32 I n d . 2 0 1 ; Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N. Y. 4 0 0 ; Perry v.
Hale, 143 Mass. 5 4 0 ; S. C. 10 N. E. 174.
The court nowhere [ * * * 4 ] finds that the defendant is guilty of actual fraud, and a failure so to find is
equivalent to a finding against the plaintiff. Elliot App. Proc. § 757; Young v. Berger, 32 N. E. 318. Even
where the price paid is inadequate, in order to avoid the sale, it must be shown that the purchaser is in
some measure responsible for it. White v. Wilson, 14 Ves. Jr. 1 5 1 ; Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180;
Russel v. Pew, 31 P. R. 7 7 ; Hudgens v. Morrow, 47 Ark. 515. The plaintiff, the j u d g m e n t debtor, knew of
the execution sales and could have directed the officer, and having failed to do so cannot now complain of
his own negligence. 2 Comp. Laws, § 3436; Jones v. Townsend (Tenn.), 5 Cen. Law J. 202. Where there is
time for redemption allowed by law, the judgment debtor must redeem or make a motion to have the sale
set aside before the time of redemption expires. Powers v. Larabee, 57 N. W. 7 9 1 , and cases; Jones v.
Townsend (Tenn.), 5 Cent. Law J. 202; Coolbaugh v. Roemer, 32 Minn. 4 4 5 ; Jenkins v. Merriweather, 109
III. 647; Stewart v. Marshal, 4 G. Green (la.), 75; State Bank v. Noland, 13 Ark. 299; Love v. Cherry, 24
l a . 210; Chambers v. Stone, 9 Ala. 260; Abercrombie v. Conner, 10 Ala. 292; 2 [ * * * 5 ] Freeman on Exec.
§ 306, p. 1039; Fletcher v. McGill, 110 I n d . 406; Rigney v. Small, 60 III. 4 1 6 ; Johnson v. Murray, 112 I n d .
154; Richey v. Merritt, 108 I n d . 347, 9 N. E. 368; Levan v. Milholland, 114 Pa. St. 49.
In order to create an estoppel in pais, the representation must relate to a present or a past state of things.
Langton v. Doud, 10 Allen, 4 3 3 ; Jackson v. Allen, 120 Mass. 79; White v. Ashton f 51 N. Y. 280. An estoppel
from the representation of a party can seldom arise, except where the representations relate to a fact, to a
present or past state of things. Union Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 549, 24 L. Ed. 676. The party
estopped must have intended that his misrepresentations should be acted upon by the party who asserts
the estoppel. Zuchtman v. Roberts, 109 Mass. 53. An attorney may purchase at an execution sale subject
to the right of his client to claim the benefit thereof. Smith v. Black, 115 U.S. 3 0 8 , 29 L. Ed. 398; Allen v.
Gillett. 127 U.S. 589, 32 L Ed. 2 7 1 ; Mining Co. v. Mason, 145 U.S. 340, 36 L Ed. 736. A levy upon part of
a tract held as tenant in common is good as against j u d g m e n t debtor. The only persons who can complain
are his cotenants. Gregory f * * * 6 ] v. Tozier, 24 Me. 308; Goodwin v. Gregg, 28 Me. 188; Varnum v.
Abbott, 7 Am. Dec. 87. In case the officer, after offering the property separately, sells en masse, such a
sale is good. Hill v. F. M. N. B., 97 U.S. 4 5 0 ; Van Valkenberg v. Trustees, 66 III. 103; Mugge v. Ginger, 59
I n d . 195.

Ir. W. H. Dickson and Messrs. Williams, Van Cott & Sutherland, for respondents.
UPGES: MERRITT, C. J. MINER and SMITH, JJ., concur.
JPINION BY: MERRITT
OPINION

[*160]

[ * * 2 5 2 ] MERRITT, C.J.:

'his action was brought to obtain a decree of the court adjudging certain deeds (mentioned in the
:omplaint, and executed by the United States marshal of Utah territory pursuant to certain execution sales
nade under a judgment obtained in the third district court by Clark, Eldredge & Co., a corporation, against
lohn M. Young, the plaintiff, and others) to be fraudulent, and that the plaintiff be permitted to redeem
rom such sales, notwithstanding the statutory time for redemption had expired, and that defendants be
•equired to convey to him the property mentioned and described in said deeds and complaint. This relief
/vas sought on the ground of gross inadequacy of the price obtained at such sales, coupled with [ * * * 7 ] a
jreat number of irregularities attending the sales, which led to the sacrifice of plaintiff's property. The
alleged irregularities are specifically set forth in the complaint, and also in the findings of the court below.
Jpon the filing of the complaint the defendants Frank B. Stephens and wife [ * 1 6 1 ] made a satisfactory
settlement with the plaintiff, and in pursuance thereof conveyed to him all their interests in the property in
controversy, and the suit as to these defendants was thereupon dismissed. After that the defendants
Schroeder and wife filed their answer, and a trial was had, which resulted in a judgment and decree in
favor of plaintiff substantially as prayed for in the complaint, from which decree, and the order denying a
new trial, this appeal is prosecuted.
The findings of fact made by the court below are very full. We have carefully examined the record, and are
satisfied that they are fully sustained by the evidence. From these findings it appears that on the 9th of
February, 1891, Clark, Eldredge & Co., a corporation, commenced an action against John M. Young (the
plaintiff herein), Henry Goddard, and George Goddard to recover $ 1,640.61, with interest from [ * * * 8 ]
January 3, 1891. That afterwards a judgment by default was entered against the plaintiff (John M. Young)
on March 6, 1891, for $ 1,673.36, and costs amounting to $ 30.50, said judgment bearing interest at 1 per
cent, per month. That Frank B. Stephens and A. T. Schroeder, partners, were the attorneys for Clark,
Eldredge & Co. in said action; that the plaintiff, John M. Young, and his sister, Lydia Y. Merrill, were the
owners in fee, as tenants in common, of all of that part of lot 2, block 70, Plat A, Salt Lake City survey,
commencing 64 1/2 feet west from the northeast corner of said lot 2, thence west 61 1/2 feet, thence
south 20 rods, thence east 94 1/2 feet, thence north 90 3/4 feet, thence east 31 1/2 feet, thence north 41
1/4 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet, thence north 148 1/2 feet, thence west 48 feet, thence north 49 1/2
feet, to the place of beginning; and also lot 12 in block 8, Five-Acre Plat A, Big Field survey, in Salt Lake
county, Utah. That the title of the plaintiff and Lydia Y. Merrill in each of said properties [ * 1 6 2 ] was
derived from the last will and testament of John Young, deceased, father of said John M. Young and Lydia
Y. Merrill, and was subject to a right [ * * * 9 ] in Sarah Milton Young and Ann Olive Young to receive each
one-fourth of the income arising from said properties during their respective lives. That the plaintiff's
interest in said portion of lot 2 at the times of the sales hereinafter mentioned was worth at least the sum
of $ 25,000, and his interest in said lot 12 was worth at least $ 1,000. (There is an alley extending from
north to south practically through the center of said portion of said lot 2.) That on the 29th day of April,
1891, an execution was issued in said action of Clark, Eldredge & Co. to the United States marshal,
directing him to levy on sufficient personal property to satisfy said judgment, and, if sufficient personal
property could not be found, then to levy on the real estate belonging to the defendants in said action; and
the marshal, being unable to find any personal property out of which to satisfy said judgment, did, on May
7, 1891, give notice that he attached and levied on [ * * 2 5 3 ] all the right, title, claim, and interest of said
plaintiff and his codefendants in said action in and to that certain parcel of land described as beginning 101
feet north and 39 1/2 feet east of the south-west corner of lot [ * * * 1 0 ] 2, block 70, Plat A, Salt Lake City
survey, running thence east 15 1/2 feet, thence north 28 feet, thence west 15 1/2 feet, thence south 28

feet, to the place of beginning; and also on that part of the same lot described as beginning 32 1/2 feet
west from the southeast corner of said lot, running thence west 38 feet, thence north 98 1/3 feet, thence
east 38 feet, thence south 98 1/3 feet, to the place of beginning; and also on a part of lot 12, block 8, FiveAcre Plat A, Big Field survey. That part of said lot 2 secondly described in said notice lies on the east side of
said alley, while that portion firstly described in the notice lies on the west side. This last-mentioned portion
was [ * 1 6 3 ] carved out of the heart of that portion of said lot 2 owned as aforesaid by plaintiff and his
sister, and there was no means of ingress to or egress from this portion so carved out of the larger tract.
That the marshal, by his return, dated July 25, 1891, certified that under said writ he had sold the property
described in the notice to John Clark, and, deducting his commissions and expenses of sale, paid the
balance realized upon said sale, viz., $ 962.36, to the attorneys of Clark, Eldredge [ * * * n ] & Co., and
further returned that there was still due and unpaid on said judgment the sum of $ 886.90. (The John Clark
mentioned in the return was a director and the principal stockholder of Clark, Eldredge & Co.)
On July 28, 1891, an alias execution issued from the said court in said action for the full sum of $ 1,673.36
and $ 30.50 costs, directed to said marshal, and thereafter the marshal made return thereon to said court
that he had levied on all the right, title, claim, and interest of said plaintiff and his codefendants in said
action in and to that certain parcel of land described as beginning 64 1/2 feet west of the northeast corner
of said lot 2, running thence west 45 1/2 feet, thence south 20 rods, thence east 78 1/2 feet, thence north
90 3/4 feet, thence east 31 1/4 feet, thence north 41 1/4 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet, thence north 148
1/2 feet, thence west 48 feet, thence north 49 1/2 feet, to the place of beginning; and certified by said
return that he had sold all the premises last described to the said Frank B. Stephens and A. T. Schroeder
for the sum of $ 828.70; and further certified that the judgment obtained by said corporation was still
unsatisfied to the extent [ * * * 1 2 ] of $ 100. (The marshal's return was erroneous in this: that the true
balance was less than $ 26.) On the 30th of September, 1891, said marshal made a further return to said
last-mentioned writ, in which he certified that on September 30, 1891, he sold all of lot 12, block 8, FiveAcre [ * 1 6 4 ] Plat A, Big Field survey, situate in Salt Lake county, and also all that certain parcel of land
described as beginning 39 feet east and 81 feet north of the southwest corner of said lot 2, running thence
north 209 feet, thence east 16 1/2 feet, thence south 209 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet, to the place of
beginning, to said Frank B. Stephens and A. T. Schroeder, for the sum of $ 136; and that, deducting the
costs and expenses of said last levy, amounting to $ 30, paid the balance, $ 106, to the attorneys of said
Clark, Eldredge & Co., and returned said writ fully satisfied. All of that part of lot 2 firstly described in this
statement, a plat of which appears in the record, constitutes a single parcel of land, and should be regarded
and treated as such, and not as being divided into separate lots or parcels; and each and every parcel of
said lot 2, block 70, plat A, so sold under said several [ * * * 1 3 ] writs of execution, was a part and portion
of that part of said lot 2 which the said John M. Young derived title to under the will of John Young,
deceased, as aforesaid.
It further appears that said Stephens furnished the marshal from time to time, with a description of the
property to be levied upon and sold under said executions, and that the officer did levy and sell, from time
to time, according to the descriptions furnished him by said Stephens. That the property so sold to said
Clark was afterwards, and prior to the commencement of this action, conveyed by Clark by quitclaim deed
to said Stephens & Shroeder, and that the same was bid in by said Stephens for said Clark. That the other
portions of said lot 2, sold under said several executions, and said lot 12, were bid in at said sales by
Stephens for himself and Shroeder, and that at none of said sales was there any other bidder than
Stephens, nor was either of said sales attended by any person other than Stephens and the officer
conducting the sales. At the time the last of these sales was made, to-wit, on 30th September [ * 1 6 5 ]
1891, the balance due Clark, Eldredge & Co. on said judgment amounted to $ 25.57, and no more,
[ * * * 1 4 ] while the property of the plaintiff was sold for $ 136 at such sale, $ 106 of which was by the
marshal paid to Stephens & Schrooder, no part of which was ever accounted for to plaintiff. It further
appears that after said several sales had been made, and before the time for redemption had expired,
Stephens informed the plaintiff that the statutory time for redemption would not be insisted upon; that the
plaintiff, believing and relying upon such promise and assurance, allowed the period for redemption to
elapse without redeeming any of said property from said sales, and that marshal's deeds were given to the
purchasers at said sales in pursuance of the statute in such cases made and provided. It further appears
that said lot 12 had been sold for taxes for the year 1890, and also for the year 1891, and that in the
month of April, 1892, after Schroeder had obtained the marshal's deed for said lot 12, he was informed

hat the plaintiff was about to redeem said lot 12 from both of said [ * * 2 5 4 ] tax sales, and that he well
inderstood at the time that plaintiff was unaware of the fact that said lot 12 had been sold under
ixecution; nevertheless he permitted the plaintiff to redeem said [ * * * 1 5 ] property from said tax sales,
ind purposely concealed from him the fact that said property had been so sold under execution, and that
le and his partner, Stephens, then held the marshal's deed therefor.
t further appears from the record that it was the design and purpose of Stephens & Schroeder at the
>utset to exhaust, if possible, all the property of plaintiff, of whatever nature or description, regardless of
ts value, under said several executions, and that they in fact accomplished that purpose. Prior to the
:ommencement of this action, plaintiff offered to pay to Stephens & Schroeder the full amount of the Clark,
Eldredge & Co. judgment, [ * 1 6 6 ] together with the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent, per month,
o compensate Stephens & Schroeder liberally for all services and trouble that they had rendered or been
)ut to in the premises, to repay all or any advances which they, or either of t h e m , might have made on
account of the property, with interest thereon, and, in addition, to give them a bonus of $ 1,000 if they
would reconvey said properties to plaintiff, which offer they declined and refused to accept. Such, in brief,
s the history of the transaction by [ * * * 1 6 ] which the plaintiff was stripped of all his possessions, and his
Droperty, worth at the time $ 26,000 or more, was taken to satisfy a judgment of about $ 1,700. An
additional feature of the transaction is that Stephens & Schroeder were members of the bar, attorneys for
:he judgment creditors, who thus, under the forms of law and the processes of the court, sought to enrich
ihemselves without any consideration for the rights of the judgment debtor, and who proceeded in
jisregard of the injustice and oppression to which he was thereby subjected.
ft is this transaction which appellants ask this court to approve. We find ourselves unable to yield to the
appeal. We may say, with t h e supreme court of the United States in the case o f Byers v. Surget, infra: "It
seems pertinent here to inquire under what system of civil polity, under what code,of law or ethics, a
transaction like that disclosed by the record in this case can be excused, or even palliated." I t is insisted by
appellants that mere inadequacy of price, however gross, will not authorize the courts to set aside a judicial
sale. The general rule undoubtedly is that mere inadequacy of price, alone, does not authorize
the [ * * * 1 7 ] disturbance of such a sale; but we are not prepared to sanction the unqualified statement of
the rule as put by appellants' counsel. If the inadequacy is so gross as at once to shock the conscience of
all fair and [ * 1 6 7 ] impartial minds, if the sacrifice is such that every honest man would hesitate to take
advantage of it, it may well be doubted whether every such case would be beyond the power of a court of
equity to relieve against.
In Byers v. Surget, 19 How. (U.S.), it is said on page 3 1 1 : "To meet the objection made to the sale in this
case, founded upon the inadequacy of the price for which the land was sold, it is insisted that the
inadequacy of consideration simply cannot amount to proof of fraud. This position, however, is scarcely
reconcilable with the qualification annexed to it by the courts, viz., unless such inadequacy be so gross as
to shock the conscience; for this qualification implies necessarily the affirmation that, if the inadequacy be
of a nature so gross as to shock the conscience, it will amount to proof of fraud." In the case of Butler v.
Haskell, 4 Desaus. Eq. 6 5 1 , the chancellor says: " I consider the result of the great body of the
cases [ * * * 1 8 ] to be that, W A f l , ?wherever the court perceives that a sale of property has been made at a
grossly inadequate price, such as would shock a correct mind, this inadequacy furnishes a strong, and, in
general, a conclusive, presumption, though there be no direct proof of fraud, that an undue advantage has
been taken of the ignorance, weakness, or the distress or necessity of the vendor; and this imposes on the
purchaser a necessity to remove this violent presumption by the clearest evidence of fairness of his
conduct."
In Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 6 S. Ct. 686, 29 L Ed. 839 r the supreme court of the United States
says: "From the cases here cited we may draw the general conclusion that, HN2l^if the inadequacy of price
is so gross as to shock the conscience, or if, in addition to gross inadequacy, the purchaser has been guilty
of any unfairness, or has taken any undue advantage, or if the owner of the property or party interested
has been for any other reason misled or surprised, then the sale will be regarded as fraudulent and void, or
[ * 1 6 8 ] the party injured will be permitted to redeem the property sold. Great inadequacy requires only
slight circumstances of unfairness in the [ * * * 1 9 ] conduct of the party benefited by the sale to raise the

presumption of fraud." All the cases unite in the doctrine that H/V3"?on gross inadequacy of price, coupled
with irregularities attending the sale, especially where such irregularities are not merely formal and
technical, but such as have a direct tendency to prevent the realizing of a fair price for the property sold,
and are attributable to the purchaser at the sale, it is the duty of the courts to set the sale aside, unless the
complaining party is estopped by his own laches. Chamblee v. Tarbox, 84 Am. Dec. 614; Howell v. Baker, 4
Johns. Ch. 118; Nesbittv. Dallam, 28 Am, Dec. 236; Morris v. Robev. 73 III. 462; Bvers v. Surgetf 60 U.S.
303, 19 HOW 303, 15 L. Ed. 670; Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 6 5. Ct. 686, 29 L. Ed. 839.
This is not a case which rests on mere inadequacy of price alone, but one where the sales complained of
were attended by such substantial irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a fair sum. For instance,
one of the parcels of said lot 2, levied upon and sold under the first execution, is described [ * * 2 5 5 ] as
beginning 101 feet north and 39 1/2 feet [ * * * 2 0 ] east of the southwest corner of said lot 2, thence east
15 1/2 feet, north 28 feet, west 15 1/2 feet, and south 28 feet to the beginning. Reference to the plat in
evidence shows that the property thus described is a portion of that part of lot 2 to which plaintiff and his
sister derived title through the will of their deceased father, as before stated, and is included within the
exterior boundaries of that portion thereof shown by the record to have been at that time leased to one
Gebhardt. The purchaser of the part thus levied on and sold by the marshal acquired a piece of land having
no means of access to it. It is needless to say that such a transaction must necessarily result in a sacrifice
of the property. Again, in the sales made under [ * 1 6 9 ] the several executions of portions of said lot 2 it
appears that in each instance the levy was upon and the sale of all the plaintiffs right, title, and interest in
a specific part of the portion of said lot 2 so owned by him and his sister, Lydia Y. Merrill. This is also an
irregularity that renders the sale voidable, if not void, the necessary tendency of a sale under such a levy
being to depreciate the value of th6 property sold.
[ * * * 2 1 ] in Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition (section 216), under the heading of "Conveyance of Part
under Execution," it is said: "We have already seen that the decisions determining the effect of a
conveyance made by a cotenant, and purporting to convey his interest in some specified parcel, are very
inharmonious. The reasons which exist in the case of a voluntary are somewhat different from those
accompanying an involuntary conveyance. HN4>:?The purchase of the grantor's interest in a specified parcel
is, in effect, a wager that such parcel will be set off to'him on partition, or otherwise confirmed to him by
the other cotenants. Still, if such circumstances exist that the grantor sees fit to make, and the grantee to
accept, a conveyance which may, in the event of an unfavorable partition, convey nothing, we can see no
valid reason for denying the utmost effect to the deed which it can be given, consistently with the rights of
the other cotenants. But in the case of an involuntary transfer of property the interest of the person whose
estate is to be divested by compulsion ought to be carefully considered and jealously guarded. If an officer
may lawfully levy on a specific parcel and subject [ * * * 2 2 ] it to forced sale, he may thereby sacrifice the
property of the defendant, for few persons would be found willing to bid for that which, when purchased,
consisted of a mere contingent interest,—an interest which the other cotenants were not bound to notice,
and which might be finally lost upon a partition of the common property. [ * 1 7 0 ] Hence the rule,
supported by a decided preponderance of the authorities, is that the levy and sale of the debtor's interest in
a specific part of the lands cannot be sustained." See, also, Starr v. Leavitt, 2 Conn. 243; Smith v. Benson,
9 Vt. 138, and the cases cited in note to Smith v. Huntoon (III. Sup.), 134 III. 24, 24 N.E. 971, 23 Am. St.
Rep. 651.
The rights of the cotenants of the judgment are not affected by the sale. In proceedings instituted by them
for partition of the common property they can ignore the same, and the result of the partition may be to
deprive the purchaser at such judicial sale of that which he bid and paid for. Such being the hazard which
the purchaser must necessarily take, it is not reasonable to suppose that any one would bid a fair price for
the property. The wisdom of the rule announced [ * * * 2 3 ] in the cases just cited is exemplified by the
facts of this case. That part of lot 2 in controversy is but 94 1/2 feet in width east and west. It is cut
through the center from north to south by an alleyway, and the record discloses that it could be most
equitably divided between the cotenants, the plaintiff and his sister, by allotting to one all of that part lying
on the east, and to the other all that lying on the west, of the alley. But it will be remembered that under
the first execution issued on the Clark, Eldredge & Co. judgment the marshal levied on and sold two parcels
of said lot 2, one of which lies on the east side of the alley and the other near the center of that portion
situate on the west side.

aw, if Lydia Y. Merrill, the cotenant of the plaintiff, or those claiming under her, should commence suit for
artition, it would be found impracticable to make such a division of the property as she or they would be
ititled to without ignoring one or the other of these sales. The court called upon to make partition would
2 constrained to ignore such sales, or at least one of them. Moreover, at the time the last sale was made
ider the executions [*171] mentioned, the [ * * * 2 4 ] balance remaining unpaid on the Clark, Eldredge
Co. judgment amounted to $ 25.57, and no more, yet the officer levied upon and sold property of Young
> satisfy an alleged balance of $ 136, and, after deducting his fees, expenses, and commissions therefrom,
aid the balance, $ 106, to Stephens & Schroeder, who retained the same ever after. This was not an
regularity merely, such as would render the sale voidable, but, the levy and sale being excessive, the sale
as absolutely void. Glidden v. Chase, 56 Am. Dec. 690; Patterson v. Carneal, 13 Am. Dec. 208; Hastings
. Johnson, 1 Nev. 613.
: will be observed that the purchasers at all the execution sales complained of except the first were the
ttomeys for the judgment creditor; that to the extent of furnishing the officer with the descriptions of the
roperty to be levied on and sold by him under the executions, they directed and controlled the processes
f the court, and directed and required the officer to levy upon and sell the property in such parcels as
endered it impossible to realize at the sales a fair price therefor. " ^ ^ A purchase [ * * 2 5 6 ] by an
ttorney for his own benefit at a sale over which [ * * * 2 5 ] he has exercised any direction or control should
ilways be closely scrutinized by the court. In Jones v. Martin, 80 Am. Dec. 641, speaking of such
>urchases, the court says: "Public policy and the analogies of the law require that they should be
onsidered per se as in the twilight between legal fraud and fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent/ or
n trust for the debtor, upon slight additional facts." See Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 117; Byers v.
lurget, 60 U.S. 303, 19 HOW 303, 15 L. Ed. 670. And where, as in this case, the attorneys, who became
)urchasers, have so directed and controlled the officer charged with the duty of executing the writ as to
ead to a sacrifice of the debtor's property, the court will not hesitate to grant relief.
[ * 1 7 2 ] It is contended by the appellants that relief cannot be granted in this case, because the statutory
period for redemption had expired before this suit was brought. The cases are by no means rare where a
:ourt of equity has interfered to set aside a sale after the time for redemption has expired, such sale having
Deen attended by irregularities, and having resulted in a gross sacrifice of the judgment [ * * * 2 6 ] debtor's
Droperty. Morris v. Robey, 73 111. 462; Blight's Heirs v. Tobin, 18 Am. Dec. 219; Bullen v. Dawson (111.
5up.), 139 III. 633, 29 N.E. 1038; Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 6 S. Ct. 686 r 29 L. Ed. 839. We may
add that it appears from the record that the plaintiff was assured by Mr. Stephens, before the period for
ademption had expired, that the statutory period would not be insisted upon; and it comes with bad grace
From the defendant now to urge that the plaintiff should be estopped by the fact that he relied upon that
promise. It is true that this assurance was given, not by defendant Schroeder, but by his partner,
Stephens. They, however, were acting in concert, engaged in a joint venture, and all the acts and
declarations of Stephens in connection with the sales and purchases in question were, under the
circumstances disclosed by this record, binding upon the defendant Schroeder. Blight's Heirs v. Tobin, 18
Am. Dec. 219.
We have made a careful examination of the record in connection with the numerous errors assigned on the
part of the appellants, and have been unable to find any error which would call for a reversal of the
decree [ * * * 2 7 ] of the court below. The fact that there was a gross sacrifice of the judgment debtor's
property at these sales is proved beyond controversy. In the same manner it is established that these sales
were attended by many and serious irregularities, for which the parties claiming through these sales were
directly responsible. Where such facts are clearly established by the evidence, and a decree is pronounced
[ * 1 7 3 ] permitting redemption on an equitable basis, it will not be disturbed because of any technical
errors in the trial of the case. Let the order and decree appealed from be affirmed.
MINER and SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Patricia HUSTON, Trustee of Trust A and Trust B under the Will of John Huston, deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
Russell R. LEWIS, Mitzi Lewis, A.R. Spaulding, and Joyce Spaulding, Defendants and Appellants.
Stateline Properties, Inc., Appellee.
No. 890476.

Sept. 12,1991.

3eal was taken from order entered in the Third District Court. Tooele County. 1 lomcr h Wilkinson. J., terminating mortgagees'
it to redeem property following foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ising to extend redemption period on equitable grounds due to commission of waste on property.

irmed.
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,LL, Chief Justice:

s is an appeal from an order of the third district court terminating appellants' right to redeem certain real property. We affirm.

or about February 28, 1989, appellee Stateline Properties, Inc. ("Stateline"), purchased the subject property at a foreclosure sale
$210,000.—- The property is located in Wendover, Utah, and was formerly known as the Patio Motel. Stateline went into
session and, while continuing to operate the property as a motel, demolished two motel units, dismantled electrical equipment, and
imenced work on other units to prepare them for eventual demolition. On March 17, 1989, appellants Mitzi and Russell Lewis,
3 had a security interest in the property, notified Stateline that the demolition was in violation of the rights of potential redeeming
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)arties. Upon receiving this notice, Stateline ceased the demolition. On August 24, 1989, 4 days before the redemption period
erminated and 160 days after Stateline ceased demolition, the Lewises informed Stateline of their intent to redeem the property and
equested an itemized statement of the amounts required to redeem, less the amounts required to repair the damage caused by
lemolition. Request was also made for a verified written statement of rents and profits since the sheriffs sale.

FN1. Patricia Huston, trustee of two trusts under the will of John Huston, commenced the foreclosure proceedings. A.R.
Spaulding, Joyce Spaulding, Russell R. Lewis, and Mitzi Lewis, all having interests in the property, were joined in the
proceedings.

)n August 28, 1989, the date on which the redemption period would otherwise end, the Lewises filed an ex parte motion to enlarge
he period for redemption under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), a petition for determination of reasonableness or propriety of the
edemption amount under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69(f)(3). and a bid showing that it would cost $388,000 to repair the damage
aused by the demolition. The Lewises also deposited $50,000 with the court which, together with a setoff of $388,000 for damage
one to the property, was argued to be more than sufficient to redeem the property. The court issued an order extending the period
or redemption to October 10, 1989, and set a hearing for September 27, 1989, to determine the reasonableness and propriety of the
mount required to redeem the property. On that same day, after the Lewises obtained the extension of time but before Stateline
sceived notice of the extension, Stateline delivered an itemized statement of the amounts required to redeem the property totaling
256,599.45. The statement did not include any setoff for waste.

)n September 6, 1989, Stateline filed a motion to dissolve the court's order extending the redemption period. A hearing was set to
ear this motion on September 8, 1989. The Lewises received notice of the hearing on September 6 and objected to the hearing on
sveral procedural grounds. One ground which has been reasserted in this appeal is that the Lewises were entitled to 10 days' notice
efore a hearing on the motion pursuant to rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, due to the fact that the memorandum in
jpport of Stateline's motion exceeded ten pages. Despite the objections, a hearing on Stateline's motion was held on September 8,
989.

.t the hearing, the Lewises alleged that because of the demolition of the motel units, they were unable to obtain financing to redeem
le property. Therefore, it was argued, equity entitles the Lewises to an extension of the redemption period and a setoff for the amount
f waste, to be determined at an evidentiary hearing, from the redemption price. Stateline argued that despite the Lewises' allegations,
}uity does not require either an extension of the redemption period or a setoff of any waste from the redemption price. Rather, any
aim for waste must be made under rule 69(g)(l) after a redeeming party's "estate has been made absolute." Stateline also asserted
at the demolition of the structures in question was necessary because the structures were unsafe, unhealthy, and *533 beyond repair,
he trial court did not, at this stage or any other stage of the proceedings, make any factual determination concerning the amount of
aste. At the close of the hearing, the court ruled that to retain their right of redemption, the Lewises must pay $260,000 into an
terest-bearing account within 5 days. The court further ordered that if the required amount was paid, the redemption period would
mtinue to run until September 27, 1989, "or until the matter is heard by the court to make the determination as far as any waste on
e property."

allowing the September 8 hearing, counsel for Stateline prepared a written order to reflect the court's ruling. The Lewises objected
the form of the proposed order, and Stateline filed a memorandum in support of the proposed order. The amount required to redeem
e property was not deposited within the allotted 5 days. After it became clear that the Lewises had not complied with the court's
jptember 6 order, Stateline filed a motion to strike the hearing that had been set for September 27, 1989. The September 27 hearing
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s not held because a criminal matter took priority that day. However, a hearing was scheduled for October 2, 1989, on the propriety
Stateline's proposed order and Stateline's motion to strike any hearing to determine the amount of waste.

or to the hearing on October 2, the Lewises filed affidavits asserting that they had obtained the $210,000, which, with the $50,000
viously deposited into the court, was sufficient to redeem the property regardless of the court's determination of the appropriate
emption price. At the hearing, the Lewises reasserted the arguments that they made at the September 8 hearing. In addition, they
ted that Merrill Title Company was holding $210,000 in escrow for the purpose of redeeming the property. They asserted that they
lid obtain release of the funds the next day, October 3. However, they requested an extension of the redemption period beyond
tober 3 in order to have additional time to obtain certificates of title to certain vehicles and an airplane that Merrill Title Company
uired as additional security.

the close of the hearing, the court ordered the Lewises to deposit in an escrow account the sum of $256,000 "and some odd cents
1 dollars" less the $50,000, previously paid into the court, by the close of business on October 3,1989. The court further ordered the
wises to deliver to Stateline a written acknowledgment that the funds were being held in escrow and a written commitment to pay
full amount held in escrow concurrently with the conveyance of the property. The Lewises, however, were unable to obtain the
tificates of title to the vehicles and the airplane by October 3. Therefore, they failed to deliver the written acknowledgment to
teline in compliance with the court's order. On October 13, 1989, the court, in accordance with its October 2 order, issued a final
ler ruling that the Lewises' redemption rights had irrevocably lapsed. The Lewises appeal from this ruling.

0 general issues are raised on appeal. First, the Lewises claim that the trial court erred in not giving them sufficient notice of the
nember 8 hearing. Second, the Lewises claim that the trial court erred in not extending the redemption period beyond October 3
1 in ruling that because they did not deposit the full amount requested to redeem the property into thecourt on that date, their
emption rights terminated.

In addressing the Lewises' first claim, it must be noted that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides that no one is entitled to
ef from an order or judgment due to an error in the judicial proceedings unless the error is harmful.—- An error is harmful when
s of sufficient impact that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."—=- Given this
idard, it is unnecessary*534 to determine if the requirements of rule 4-501 must be met on a motion to dissolve an order granted
parte. It is clear from the record that if the court did err, the error was harmless. At the October 2 hearing, the Lewises were
>wed to reassert the arguments they made at the September 8 hearing. Indeed, after the October 2 hearing, the court modified its
)tember 8 ruling, in effect extending the redemption period to October 3. Since the Lewises clearly had adequate time to prepare
the October 2 hearing, any error that resulted in inadequate time to prepare for the September 8 hearing was harmless.
HM2. Utah R.Civ .P. 61: Martineait v. Anderson. 636 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Utah 1981): Jensen \>. Ea/nes. 30 Utah 2d 423. 519
P.2d 236.238 (1974) (no prejudice resulted from the failure to follow the five-day notice requirement of rule 6(d)).

FN3. Stare v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116. 120 (Utah 1989).

The Lewises' main contention is that the trial court erred in not extending the redemption period beyond October 3 and in ruling
because they did not deposit the full amount requested into the court on that date, their redemption rights terminated. Central to
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his claim is the trial court's authority to enlarge a redemption period and the degree of deference we grant to the trial court's decision
Ate have stated that in appropriate circumstances, a court may enlarge a redemption period under Utah Rule of Civil Proceduie
]_M_1

>(b)

Rule 6(b) provides, "When by these rules

or cause shown may at any time in its discretion

an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specific time, the court
order the period enlarged

ve review the court's decision for an abuse of that discretion

" Since mlc 6(b) clearly grants the court discretion,

Generally, we will not find an abuse of discretion unless, given the

ipphcable law and facts, the trial court's decision is unreasonable
FN4 Mollerup \ Storage Swtems Intl %9 P 2d 1122 II24 (I tah 1977)

FN 5 See id at 1125

PN6 See Stare v Pt let sen. 810 P 2d 421.424 (Utah 1991). Stale \ Reunite:. 817 P 2d 774 781 n 3 (Utah 1991)

FK7

he right of redemption from a foreclosure sale is a statutory right provided by Utah Code Ann fe ^8 37 6
The procedures for
ademption are set out in Utah Rule of Ci\il Piocedlire 69(f) Under rule 69(f), property bought at a foreclosure sale "may be
adeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon" plus
ertain enumerated expenses
In addition, a credit may be given if rents or profits are collected during the redemption period
uk 69(1)(3) provides procedures for determining the reasonableness and propriety of the amount requested for redemption
lowhere in *535scuion 78- 37 6 or mlc 69(1) is there a provision allowing for the amount of waste committed on the property to
nter into the formulation of the redemption amount

rN7 Utah Code Ann fr 78 37-6 provides, "Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens are
subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions generally "

FN8 Utah Rule o( C \\ ll Pioccdun 69(00) provides

(3) Time for redemption, amount to be paid The property may be redeemed from the purchaser within six months after
the sale on paying the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together with the amount of any
assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any
improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase, with interest on such
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, other than the
judgment under which said purchase was made, the amount of such hen, with interest

FN9 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69(f)(6) provides

(6) Rents during period of redemption The purchaser from the time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from
the time of his redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from the tenant in possession the rents of the

Page 6 of 11

property sold or the value of the use and occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by the
judgment creditor or purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the property thus sold preceding such redemption, the
amounts of such rents and profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid....

FN10. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69(H(3) provides:

In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person
seeking redemption may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out of which
execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth the item
or items demanded to which he objects, together with his grounds of objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an
order fixing a time for hearing of such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for hearing shall be served
on the purchaser not less that two days before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court shall enter
an order determining the amount required for redemption.

I It is well established that the right of redemption is a "substantive right to be exercised in strict accord with statutory terms."
>t only is the right of redemption substantive, but also we have stated that the procedures for redemption often confer substantive
hts. ^112. Generally, therefore, when the procedure at issue affects the substantive rights of the parties,-'—5- the procedure should be
lowed strictly in order not to interfere with these rights.

FNII. Mollerup. 569 P.2d at 1124; see also Utah Code Ann. S 78-37-6.

FN12. See Mollerup. 569 P.2d at 1124; United States v. Looslew 55) P.2d 506.508 (Utah 1976); see also Tech-Fluid Serw
v. Gavilan Operating 787 P.2d 1328. 1333 (Utah ClApp.). cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

FN13. We note that not all redemption procedures can be characterized as substantive in all circumstances. In dealing with
procedures that do not affect substantive rights, substantial compliance is generally sufficient. Indeed, we have stated that in
such situations we will give the rules a

liberal construction and application to permit a property owner who can pay his debts to do so, and thus make his creditor
whole, and save his property. Therefore, if a debtor, acting in good faith, has substantially complied with the procedural
requirements of the rule in such a manner that the lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely effected, and getting what
he is entitled to, the law will not aid in depriving the mortgagor of his property for mere falling short of exact compliance
with technicalities.

Looslew 551 P.2d at 508; see also Tech-Fluid Serv.. 787 P.2d at 1332-34; Household Fin. Corp. v. Bacon. 58 Or.App.
267. 648 P.2d 421.423 (1982V. Gesa Fed. Credit Union v. Mutual Life Ins.. 105 Wash.2d 248. 713 P.2d 728.731-33
(1986) (en banc).
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VNU. See Mollerup. 569 P.2d at 1124:/>ws/gy.551 P.2d at 508: Tedi-Fluid Sen\. 787 P.2d at 1333.

41 It is clear that the right of a purchaser at a sheriffs sale either to receive the proper redemption amount in accordance with rule
S9ff) or to have the title perfected at the end of the six-month period is a substantive right.

^ Accordingly, strict compliance with

he six-month redemption period is normally required.--*— Notwithstanding the foregoing, we have also recognized that in
exceptional circumstances, a court sitting in equity may extend a redemption period ——L or set aside a sheriffs sale after the period
or redemption.—— However, a court should take such an action only when the equities of the case are compelling and "move the
conscience of the court."

FN 19

FN15. See Mollerup. 569 P,2d at 1124: Looslew 551 P.2dat508: Tech-Fluid Sen*.. 787 P.2d at 1333.

FN 16. See Mollerup. 569 P,2d at 1124: Looslew 55) P.2d at 508: Teeh-Flvid Serv.. 787 P.2d at 1333.

FN 17. Mollerup. 569 P.2d at 1124: see also Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 621-22 (2d ed. 1985).

FN18. Youns v. Sciiroec/er. 10 Utah 155. 37 P. 252. 256 (1894), affd, 161 US. 334. 345. 16 S.O. 512. 516. 40 L.hd. 721
(1896).

FN 19. Mollerup. 569 P.2d at 1124: see also Schroeder, 37 P. at 256: Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 621-22
(2d ed. 1985).

^n example of such a case is Young v. Schroeder,—=- where this court, in a suit initiated after the period for redemption had expired,
et aside foreclosure sales on the grounds that there was a gross sacrifice of the debtor's property and "the sales were attended by
lany and serious irregularities, for which the parties claiming under the sales were directly responsible."—=- We relied on the
D1 lowing facts: Land worth $26,000 was sold to satisfy a judgment of $1,700, the purchasers were the attorneys for the judgment
ebtor, the purchasers directed the land to be sold in parcels in a manner that prevented the land from being sold at a fair price, and
ie purchasers assured the debtor that they *536 would not insist on the statutory period for redemption.
tclded, Mollerup v. Storage Systems International,

l

In a case more recently

^ we stated that a court may allow a mortgagor to redeem property after the

x-month period to "relieve the mortgagor of the consequences of fraud, accident, mistake, or waiver...." -^— In Mollerup, however,
e also made it clear that the mere allegation of a dispute is generally not sufficient to justify an extension of the redemption period.
To determine otherwise would allow others similarly situated to simply appear ex parte, assert a dispute ... or some other self-serving

tatter, and the effect would be to abridge the rights of a purchaser at sale." ——

FN20. 10 Utah 155. 37 P. 252. 256 (1894). affd, 161 U.S. 334. 345. 16 S.Ci. 512. 516.40 L.Ed. 721 (1896).

FN21. Schroeder. 37 P. at 256.
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FN22.A/.at254-56.

FN23.569P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977).

FN24. Id. al 1124. In fact, in United States v. Looslew 551 P.2d 506.508 (Utah 1976). we held that a purchaser's failure to
object to technical deficiencies in the method of tenure within the redemption period constituted a waiver of the deficiency.

FN25. Mollerup. 569 P,2d at 1125.

i Lewises, therefore, bear a heavy burden in this appeal. In order to succeed, they must show that the equities of their case are so
npelling that the trial judge acted unreasonably in not extending the period. The Lewises base their claim on two alternate theories,
st, they allege that the waste Stateline committed interfered with their ability to finance the redemption. Therefore, it is argued,
ore the Lewises were required to tender the redemption amount, they were entitled to a hearing on the amount of waste and a setoff
this amount from the redemption price. Accordingly, the redemption period should have been extended to allow the parties to
edule an evidentiary hearing and conduct limited discovery. It is admitted that no provision exists, in either section 78-37-6 or rule
jQ, for the amount of waste committed by a purchaser to enter into the formulation of the proper redemption amount. However, the
vises assert that under the circumstances, equity requires a setoff of the amount of waste. Under their theory, the amount of the
)ff should be arrived at through the procedures set out in rule 69(0(3) which provide for a hearing to resolve disputes concerning
appropriate redemption amount.

the alternative, the Lewises claim that even if they were not entitled to a setoff, equity entitles them to a extension of the
emption period of 3 to 4 days beyond October 3 in order to have additional time to obtain the certificates of title needed to finance
redemption. This claim is also based on the allegation that the waste committed on the property interfered with their ability to
ince the redemption.

In addressing the Lewises' first argument, it must be noted that their claim involves more than an assertion that equity requires an
msion of the redemption period. It also entails the assertion that equity requires that a factor not specifically provided for in rule
Q be included in the calculation of the redemption amount. Neither party has cited any controlling authority that directly deals with
ti a claim, and it appears that this issue has never been before this court. However, it is not necessary to resolve this issue in the
ant case. Even assuming that a court sitting in equity has the authority to order a setoff, in order to succeed in their claim the
/ises must also establish that they are entitled to an extension of the redemption period to determine the extent of the waste. A
ew of the record clearly shows that there are no compelling circumstances —— that would require an enlargement of the
;mption period.

FN26. In the instant case, there were three hearings. In each hearing, the court was confronted with different circumstances
and arguments, and in each of the later hearings, the court modified an earlier ruling. The only final ruling is the October 13
order, which terminated the Lewises' redemption rights pursuant to the court's October 2 order. The October 2 order was
issued after a hearing held on that same day. It is only this ruling that is before this court. See Utah R.App.P. 3(a): see also,
e.g., Sah.etti v. Backman. 638 P.2d 543. 544 (Utah 1981): Salt Lake Citx Corp. v. iMxton. 600 P.2d 538. 539 (Utah 1979)
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(both holding that only a final order is appealable). Since the Lewises were not harmed by any of the previous hearings, see
supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text, the relevant circumstances to this appeal are the circumstances presented at the
October 2 hearing.

t is a well-established principle of equity that in order to claim equitable relief a *537 party must have acted in an equitable
ashion.The Lewises were aware of the demolition on March 17, 1989, but waited until August 28,1989, the last day of the
edemption period, to assert their claim. By waiting until the last moment to raise their claim, the Lewises insured that if the court
iccepted their argument, Stateline would be prejudiced. Under the Lewises' theory, Stateline would have to accept the Lewises'
letermination of the amount of the waste or the redemption period would have to be enlarged in order for the court to make the
letermination. Since there is no reason given for the delay and since the delay prejudiced Stateline, the Lewises are not in a strong
>osition to claim they are entitled to equitable relief.—~

hN27. Coleman Co. v. Southwest Field Irrigation Co.. 584 P.2d 883,884 (Utah 1978); see also Hor ton v. Morton, 695 P 2d
102. 107 (Utah 1984).

PN28. It is true that under rule 69(f)(3), a party may raise a dispute near the end of the redemption period by paying "the
amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court ..." and filing "with the court a petition setting
forth the item or items demanded to which he objects, together with the grounds of the objection...." In such a case, the court
may set a hearing to determine the appropriate redemption price at a time after the running of the redemption period. See
generally Galloway v. Merrill. 801 P.2d 942.943 (Utah Ct.App.1990). However, it is also true that the rules do not provide
for the amount of waste to enter into the formulation of the redemption amount. The Lewises' claim is one in equity, and
therefore equitable principles should govern the claim.

must also be remembered that at the October 2 hearing, the Lewises asserted that they could obtain the full amount requested by
)ctober 3. Therefore, at the time the court issued its October 2 order it appeared that any waste committed on the property did not
efeat the Lewises' ability to redeem and that the Lewises would indeed recover the property. Furthermore, there was no showing that
le Lewises would not be able to recoup any damage done to the property after they tendered the full redemption amount.

is true that the Lewises were unable to obtain the necessary funds by October 3. However, they cannot fault the trial court for
flying on their own representations,
particularly when they had ample time to petition the court for a modification of its order
etween October 3 and the issuance of the final ruling on October 13. Given these facts and the fact that at the time of the October 2
earing the redemption period had in effect been extended for approximately five weeks, the trial court's order refusing to grant an
^tension for sufficient time to conduct an evidentiary hearing cannot be considered unreasonable.

PN29. See Battistone \\ American Land & Dew Co., 607 P 2d 837. 839 (Utah 1980) (generally equity "will not assist one in
extricating himself from circumstances which he has created").

J. The Lewises' second argument fails for the same reason as the first. There were no compelling circumstances that would render
e trial court's decision unreasonable. Indeed, disregarding the claim that the Lewises are entitled to a setoff, the simple facts that the
evvises assured the court they would have the funds by October 3 and that the redemption period had already been extended
Page 10 of 11

proximately five weeks are sufficient to uphold the trial court's decision not to extend the redemption period past October 3. The
il court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Lewises to deposit the full amount into the court on October 3 and in
ing that the Lewises' redemption rights irrevocably lapsed due to their failure to comply with the court's order.——

FN30. We only decide the narrow issue presented by appellants of whether the court erred in not extending the redemption
period beyond October 3, 1989. We do not reach the question of whether the court abused its discretion in extending the
period to October 3.

firmed.

)Wh. Associate Chief Justice, and SlbWART. DURHAM, and ZIMMERMAN. JJ., concur.
ih,1991.
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant assignee sought review of two orders of the District Court of Salt
Lake County (Utah), which granted two ex parte motions of respondent trustee in bankruptcy to extend
the time for redemption after foreclosure on real property.
OVERVIEW: The assignee was the successful bidder on real estate that had been foreclosed upon by
the creditor. Subsequently, the debtors filed a petition in bankruptc/ and a trustee in bankruptcy was
appointed. The six month period for redemption of the foreclosed real estate expired. The trustee in
bankruptcy, on the basis of two ex parte motions, obtained two ex parte orders from the district court,
which extended the redemption period. The assignee appealed both of the orders. Upon review, the
court reversed, vacated, and set aside the orders. The court held that the extensions that were granted
by the district court were not based upon adequate cause shown as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b), and
thus amounted to an abuse of discretion under the facts of the case.
OUTCOME: The court reversed, vacated, and set aside the orders that granted the motions of the
trustee in bankruptcy to twice extend the time for redemption after foreclosure on real property upon
which the assignee had successfully bid.

CORE TERMS: redemption, purchaser, right of redemption, extending, foreclosure sales, judgment of
foreclosure, technical defects, foreclosure, expiration, equitable, mortgagor, tendered, expired, ex parte,
right to redeem, cause shown, bankrupt, notice
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OPINION BY: HALL
OPINION

[ * 1 1 2 3 ] D. Richard Moench appeals from two orders of the District Court of Salt Lake County extending
the time for redemption after foreclosure on real property.
The factual sequence giving rise to this controversy is as follows: Defendants Robert T. and Ernestina M.
Martin hereinafter referred to as "Martins," purchased real estate assigning their interest therein to plaintiff,
J. A. Mollerup, hereinafter referred to as "Mollerup," as security for a loan. Martins defaulted on the

contract and summary judgment of foreclosure was granted in favor of Mollerup who in turn assigned his
interest to appellant, D. Richard Moench, hereinafter referred to as "Moench," who was the successful
bidder at the sheriffs sale. Thereafter, Martins filed a petition in bankruptcy and respondent, John C.
Green, hereinafter referred to as "Green," was appointed trustee.
The six month period of redemption [ * * 2 ] l expired on October 13, 1976, and based on an ex parte
motion of Green the lower court entered an order on October 15, 1976, extending the redemption period
for 45 days and Green subsequently sought and obtained a second ex parte order extending the
redemption period for 45 days from the date this Court renders its opinion on appeal.
FOOTNOTES
I Rule 69 (f) U.R.C.P.

The sole question on appeal involves the power of the lower court to extend the redemption period, and if
so, upon what circumstances.
HN1

*+T\t\e 78-37-6 U.C.A., 1953, establishes the statutory right of redemption from foreclosure sales:
Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to
redemption as in case of sales under executions generally . . . .

HN2

? R u l e 69 (f)(3) U.R.C.P. establishes the time for redemption from sales on execution.
The property may be redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying
the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together with the
amount [ * * 3 ] of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and
necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the property which the
purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase, with interest on such amounts, and, if the
purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, other
than the judgment under which said purchase was made, the amount of such lien, with
interest . . . .

The orders of the trial court are apparently based on Rule 6 (b) U.R.C.P. which reads in part as follows:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court an act is required
or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time
in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request
[ * 1 1 2 4 ] therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous o r d e r . . . . but it may not extend the time for taking any action under
Rules 50 (b), 52 (b), 59 (b), (d) and (e), 60 (b) and 73 (a) and (g), except to the extent and
under the conditions stated in them. [Emphasis added.]
[ * * 4 ] HN3m^j^ie provisions of said Title 78-37-6, supra, are more than procedural; they confer and define
the extent of the right to redeem, as well as provide the method in which redemption shall be made. 2
FOOTNOTES

Local Realty Co. v. LindquisL

96 Utah 297, 85 P.2d 770 (1938).

V4

"?Yhe right of redemption has long been recognized as a substantive right to be exercised in strict
:cord with statutory terms. 3 It is not an equitable right created or regulated by principles of equity but,
Jther, is a creature of statute and depends entirely upon the provisions of the statute creating the right.
=OOTNOTES
j 50 CJ.S. Judicial Sales Sec. 37(c); Colvin v. Weiaold, 31 Ariz. 370, 253 P. 6 3 3 ; State ex rel. Anderson
f. Kerr, 51 Minn. 417, 53 N.W. 719; State v. O'Connor, 6 N.D. 285, 69 N.W. 692.
\ Kuper v. Stoiack, 57 Wash. 2d 482, 358 P.2d 132; Burwell & Morford v. Seattle Plumbing Supply Co.,
14 Wash. 2d 537, 128 P.2d 859.

] * * 5 ] Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate instances extend the
eriod. This Court has recognized that equitable principle by setting aside a sale after the time for
ademption had expired, when the sale was attended by such substantial irregularities as must have
revented a sale at a fair sum, resulting in a gross sacrifice of the judgment creditor's property. 5 A similar
ase can be made to relieve a mortgagor of the consequences of fraud, accident, mistake, or waiver as was
Dund to exist in United States v. Loosley, Utah, 551 P.2d 506 (1976). In that case, the mortgagor tendered
ayment for redemption to the purchaser's attorney one day prior to the expiration of the six month period
nd the same was returned eight days later with the explanation it had been tendered to the wrong person
nd citing additional other technical defects. The court held that the refusal to accept the tender was not
jstified and the failure to state objections to the tender was deemed to be a waiver of any such technical
lefects.
FOOTNOTES
s Young v. Schroeder,

10 Utah 155, 37 P. 252. Affirmed in 161 U.S. 334, 40 L Ed. 7 2 1 , 16 S. Ct. 512.

[ * * 6 ] This Court has also considered the matter of bankruptcy after foreclosure and sale 6 and has
letermined that H/V5: ?such does not extend the time of redemption. If the bankrupt, or his trustee, fails to
exercise the right of redemption during the period provided by law, the right is lost.
FOOTNOTES
6 Layton v. Laytonf

105 Utah 1, 140 P.2d 759.

r

he facts and circumstances of this particular case reflect nothing as would move the conscience of the
Zourt in favor of Green. A further brief review of the facts points this out. He readily admits that no t e n d e r 7
vas ever made since the bankrupt estate was and is entirely without assets and that the only prospect of
m "asset" is the value, if any, of the right of redemption for which he is hopeful of finding a purchaser. He
nerely filed an affidavit alleging the redemption figures were not promptly furnished and were
juestionable.
FOOTNOTES
7 Rule 69 (f)(3), U.R.C.P. provides in the event of a disagreement as to reasonableness of sum
demanded for redemption the sum necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, may be paid

to the Court and a petition filed, with objection, and a determination made after hearing.

[ * * 7 ] It is obvious that Green is in no position to redeem and is merely attempting to sell the right of
redemption. It is also obvious that because of the economic conditions which have prevailed during the
some 16 months that have elapsed since the foreclosure sale, that land values have increased sharply and
the prolonged redemption period has certainly worked in favor of Green.
Green asserts that equity favors his position, however, when we consider the position [ * 1 1 2 5 ] of Moench
who expended in excess of $76,000.00 to purchase and has been prevented from perfecting title for a
period of 16 months it is clear that the equities are balanced in the latter's favor. To determine otherwise
would allow others similarly situated to simply appear ex parte, assert a dispute, a possible sale of the right
to redeem, or some other such self-serving matter and the effect would be to abridge the rights of a
purchaser at sale.
The extensions granted were not based upon adequate cause shown as required under Rule 6 (b), supra,
and amounted to an abuse of discretion under the facts of this case.
The orders are reversed, vacated, and set aside. Costs awarded to Moench.
WE CONCUR: A. H. Ellett, [ * * 8 ]
Frank Wilkins, Justice.
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And you knew that you had 18 0 days to redeem this

property.
A.

I didn't know how long I had to re- -- redeem the

property, but yes, I knew there was a time limit.
Q.

Why did you start contacting Mr. Doriusf office at a

specified time then, if you don't --if you didn't know that
you only had a period of time to redeem?
A.

Because, ah, my daughter, which was going to lend me

the money to pay him off immediately, would not lend me the
money until we had the title clean from the bank and the
release, the reconveyance, ah, from the bank.

And then she

had the money that she would have borrowed me at that time.
Q.
correct?

And Mr. Quesenberry was representing you with that;
You were represented by counsel through a deed of

reconveyance issue.
A.

Ah, not -- not at that time.

Q.

In April?

A.

Oh, the deed or -- yes.

Q.

And you indicated earlier there were several other

liens on the property as well.

Did Mr. Quesenberry assist you

with -- with those as well?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.
So you were represented by him during that process.
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A.

Yes.

Q.

So you -- you don!t have any proof that you actually

had a bank loan and you were able to come up with those funds.
It was something that your son was doing; correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

It was in your son's name.

A.

Mostly Ifd done all the stuff for him.

to do was sign the final documents.

All he had

We were set up for the

closing and just waiting on payoff from you.
Q.

The person that did this appraisal didn't actually

get a copy of this report to, I guess, your son and the
proposed lender until, ah, May 9th of 2007; true?
A.

Ah, I donf t know.

Q.

And I apologize.

A.

He'd been down --

Q.

I'm not sure what the exhibit was, the appraisal,

what it came in under, what number that was.
THE COURT:

Was it —

Can you help us with that Selma?

Do you

have an exhibit number for the appraisal?
CLERK:

No. 3.

THE COURT:

And where are the exhibits now?

Mr. Bailiff, can you help us with that?

Who's my

Bailiff today?
Will you come up to the witness desk and gather up
everything that's got an exhibit tag on it and give it to the
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